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Summary findings
Esfahani addresses the puzzle of sluggish investment in  rest of the population from ictive participition,  without
the Philippines' dominant telecommunications firm,  actually denying their citizenship. (This social structure is
PlI.DT.  This case  allows a study of the underlying causes  beginning to change.)
of success or failure in a privately owned infrastructure  The president of the country has great leeway in
sector in a developing country.  setting and implementing regulations, so the elite group
Since its inception, PLDT has been privately owned  associated with the president can unilaterally modify
and has had direct access  to international capital  telecommunications r  licy in a way that serves its
markets. But its services have been deficient, in quality  interests. Those in control of PLD)T  find investing in the
and quantity, since the early 1960s.  company's highly capital-intensive  facilities risky if they
Using a transaction costs  approach,  Esfahani  are not connected  to the president's circle. As a result,
hypothesizes that contracting  problems between various  the government has an incentive to redistribute quasi-
economic players are important  determinants of  rents through regulatory mechanisms. This imposes a
observed outcomes. Poor services are attributed to  strong 'political business cycle" on Pl.DT's growth
factors that impede implementation of performance-  pattern:  Investment rises only in the early years of
improving implicit or explicit contracts,  including  "friendly" administrations and remains low at all other
regulatory  -iles and regu'ations.  times. Esfahani establishes this relationship by empirical
After reviewing PLDT's responses to events in the last  analysis.
six decades, Esfahani demonstrates that the problem can  Despite the failure of cyclical  investment, no attempt
be traced to lack of commitment to regulatory policies  has been made to reform the regulatory system because
b,yond  the term of each administration  - because A.  most solutions require an institutional commitment  to a
relatively weak legislature and judiciary are dominated by  set of rules and procedures that are either infeasible or
the executive branch. This system of governance is linked  contrary to the interests of the elite. Certain  reforms arc
to the nature of Philippine society: a small elite engaged  becorm .g increasingly feasible, however, as a new middle
in competitive politics among themselves tries to bar the  class develops and elite alliances shift.
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of a larger regulatory research effort in the department. The study was  funded by the Banik's  Research  Support Budget under
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free from the World Bank,  1  XIX  H Street NW, Washington, D)C  20433. Pleasecontact Bill  Moore, room N9-055, extension
35261  (78 pages). April 1994.
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Policymakers  the world over have come to see privatization  as an important  remedy for the
ills of economies long  dominated  by state-owned  enterprises.  Private sector involvement  is expected  to
bring increased resouirces  and efficiency  to ailing public enterprises. Yet it is still an open question
whether private enterprises  can perform well in situations  where public ones have failed. Indeed,
many private enterprises  in developing  countries  have track records no better than those of typical
public enterprises in similar situations.  What are the necessary  conditions  for the success of the
private sector in a developing  economy  ? Certainly, it takes more than a simple  transfer of ownership
for a firm or industry to prosper.
What does the experience  of the telecommunications  sector in the Philippines  tell us about this
question'?  The Philippines  case is particularly interesting  because it provides an opportunity  to study
the underlying  causes of success and failure in ari  infrastructure  sector in a developing  country in
which most firms have been privately  owned  since the industry's infancy.  The main operators in the
sector have had direct access  to international  capital markets and have managed  to raise large amounts
of debt relative to their equity, yet the sector has not performed very well: telephone  density is low
(about 1.7 telephone  sets and 1.1 mainlines  per 100 people), waiting lists for basic services are long,
and service quality is roundly attacked  (Gavino 1992). Even taking the country's level of development
into account, the sector seems to have had no edge over its counterparts  in other countries, including
those under public ownership  or with more restricted  access  to foreign  capital (figure 4.1).
These observations  compel us to ask what factors impeded  growth of the sector. Why wasn't
there any effective  regulatory reform to create stronger investment  incentives  for the firms involved  in
the sector'?  Why did the sector remain in private hands despite its poor performance'?  The approach
adcpted in this paper to answer these questions  presumes  that the nature of contracting  problems
between  various players in the  economy  is an important  determinant  of observed  outcomes. The
analysis  that follows  traces the sector's poor performance  to the weakness  of commitment  mechanisms
needed to make contracts  credible. The inadequacy  of commitment  mechanisms  springs from a system
of governance  in which the legislature  and judiciary are relatively  weak and dominated  by a strong
executive. This system of governance  can in turn be related  to a "fundamental"  characteristic  of the
Philippine society: the dominance  of a small elite who engage in competitive  politics among
themselves, but trv to bar the rest of the population  from active  participation  without  formally taking
away their citizenship.
Certainly, the above characteristic,  shaped by the country's past, is not immutable. Therefore,
implications  of the analysis  that follows  for future policy needs to take account of changes in the
distribution  of political power in response  to external  factors and internal  dynamics.  Indeed, the3
economic  and political developments  in the country  over the past four decades  seem to have brought
about a wider distribution  of power in recent years. This change has the poteintial  to mitigate sUi..e  of
the main shortcomings  of the telecommunications  policy.
To make the task of the study manageable,  the discussion  focuses  on the histor, of the
sector's dominant firm, the Philippine  Long Distance  Telephone  Company  (PLDT). which owns about
90 percent of the working phone lines and has a virtual monopoly  over domestic and international
long-distance  telephone  circuits in the country. A government-owned  company, TELOF, operates
about 2 percent of the countr-'s telephones,  and more than sixty small private and local-government-
owned operators  control the remaining  8 percent. There are also several other firms  engaged in
providing  telegraph, telex, paging, cellular telephony,  and similar servict;s.'
Political  structure  and commitment  capability
Identifying  the origins of weak regulatory  commitment  capability in the Philippines  is critical
to an understanding  of the dynamics  of telecommunications  policy and performance  and to the design
of institutions  that can contribute  constructively  to rapid deveiopment.
The making of basic Philippine  institutions
The Philippines  became  a U.S. colony in the closing  years of the nineteenth  century, scon
after four centuries of Spanish  rule had come to an end. An important  legacy of Spanish  domination
was an open economy  based on exports of primary products by large farms, a pattern that continued
under U.S. rule. Over time, a strong patronage  system arose headed by an agrarian elite with close
ties to U.S. politicians  and business  leaders. The group's small size, common interests, and pervasive
kinship network enabled it to overcome internal  political  and economic  rivalries and promote the
group's interests  over those of the rest of the population. U.S. policy interests in thc region worked to
foster the economic  and political  dominance  of this group as well, since the U.S. government  was
interested  in establishing  a political system in the Philippines  that would remain stable and friendly to
the United States. Through a process of negotiated  independence,  this elite group gradually acquired
'Data on the performance  of PLDT are based largely on information  provided  by the company
and in its annual reports. Additional  information  has been obtained from annual reports of the
National Telecommunications  Commission  and from the 20K forms the company  has filed with the
U.S. Securities  and Exchange  Commission.  The macroeconomic  data are based on the International
Monetary  Fund's International  Financial  Statistics.4
the knowledge,  skills, and institutions  necessary  to run the gove:nment  and, following  independence
in 1946, that group took control. The country's institutions  reflected  the dualism  of Philippine  society,
the objectives  of the U.S. government,  and the elite's desire to maintain  its privileges. Several
features  were especially  prominent.
* Competitive  politics. To ensure stability  and effectiveness,  the institutions  of government
had to have legitimacy  among  the popul2tion  at large and to minimize  damaging  infighting  among the
eiite. A U.S.-style constitution  inaugurated  in 1935  called for separation  of powers and competition
for control of the executive  and legislative  branches  through elections.  The executive,  headed by a
directly elected president, was to lead the country. Presidents  were limited to two 4 years terms. A
bicameral legislature,  consisting  of a I 10-memrber  House of Representatives  elected from the
provinces  and a 24-member  Senate  elected at large, was to provide an arena for political brokerage.
The judiciary, led by an eleven-member  Supreme  Court, was to serve as referee.
* Qualifications  control  and plurality rule. To restrict political competition  to members  of the
elite, a nine-member  Electoral  Tribunal-three members  from the Suprerne  Court and three members
each from the two parties with the largest number  of votes in the Congress-was established  to rule
on the qualifications  of members  of Congress.  This arrangement  effectively  undermined  any third
party stirrings and kept political outsiders at bay. 2 The influence  of those outside the political elite
was further weakened  by the plurality rule for elections:  the candidate  with the highest  share of the
popular vote won the seat. The plurality  rule reduced  the bargaining  power of the non-elite  and
contributed  to the weakening  of third parties and the entrenchment  of a two-party  system.
* Dominant  executive.  Power was concentrated  in the hands of the president, and the
functions  of the legislature  and the judiciary  were circumscribed.  It would be risky to give Congress
too strong a hand in setting  policies and allocating  resources  because  its members  were in close
contact  with the voters, which could give political  outsiders opportunity  to exploit rivalries among  the
candidates  and influence  them once elected. The most effective  powers vested in Congress  were
negative  powers (restricting  budget allocations,  limiting  civil service salaries, blocking  entry of new
firms). Similarly,  a strong and independent  judiciary was viewed  unfavorably  because it could be used
by the non-elite  to restrict the actions  of the elite. The presidency,  on the othier  hand, as a single,
nationally  elected  office, could hardly be influenced  by the non-elite. 3
2When  six members  of the communist-led  Democratic  Alliance  were elected  to the Congress in
1946, the Electoral  Tribunal chose to disqualify  them (Wurfel 1988, 101).
3Shugart  and Carey (1992, 175, 187) attribute  the strength  of the executive  in the Philippines  to
the importance  of local politics and the desire of the elite to bring benefits  to their regions while
"freeing  themselves  of direct involvement  with broader  national  policy matters." However, facts such5
1'he power of the presidency  was embodied  in a number  of constitutional  and legal
provisions. 4 'I'he  president could issue decrees with the force of legislation  and had line-item  veto
power over legislationi  (overrule required a two-thirds  majority  of both houses), and could  suspend
elected officials for cause (Wurfel 1988,  76, 77, and 90). In times of national  emergency  Congress
could authorize  the president  to rule by decree for a limited  period. The president  could also declare
martial law without  the consent  of the Congress.  While Congress  could not increase budget  items
proposed by the president, the president  could treat the budget  approved  by the Congress  as partially
fungible.  Thus mnembers  of Congress  needing  to keep their 1,tronage machines  will oiled were at the
mercy of the president.
*  Weak  jidiciary. The judiciary's weakness  was manifest  mainly in the control of its
resources by Congress  and the president. 5 The president,  with the approval  of Congress, appointed
judges at all levels, while Congress  set judicial budgets and salaries. Although  the Supreme  Court
gained respect for its relative independence,  political appointees  at the lower courts were often
entangled  in patronage politics (Wurfel 1988, 88-90). This system allowed  the elite to control the
judicial process while the non-elite  suffered the effects  of the inordinate  delays and costs of pursuing
justice. The system also gave the president  a relatively  free hand in issuing  executive  orders and
taking arbitrary action without  being challenged. 6 The Supreme  Court was further restrained  by a
number  of constitutional  provisions,  particularly  the requirement  of a two-thirds  majority  vote for
declaring  a law or treatv unconstitutional.
a  Two-parrt system with weak, indistinguishable parties. Competition for control of the
presidency  was intense,  since the presidency  brought with it the power to channel  enormous
resource<.  Elite groups outside  the ruling  coalition  were always looking  for ways to replace  those
as the highly  centralized  nature of the Philippine  government  and the president's considerable  control
over local government  do not support this view.
41ndices  developed by Shugart  and Carey (1992)  to gauge the relative legislative  and
nonlegislative  powers of the popularly  elected  presidents  around the world place the Philippines  in the
group of countries withi  the Imost  powerful presidencies (figure 8.1,  156).
5The  executive  Jlso exerted some control over cases being  brought before the courts by having
state prosecutors  screen lawsuits before  they are seen by a judge (Bacungan  and Tadiar 1988, 178).
'Several clearly excessive  cases, however, were brought before the Supreme  Court and struck
down, among  them President  Quirino's attempt  to ram the budget  through by executive  order in 1949
and President Marcos's creation of thirty municipalities  by decree in 1968 (Wurfel 1988, 77).6
inside. 7 Given the electoral rules, their best chance was to coalesce  as an opposition  party and
support those in the coalition  with the greatest political  talents. All involved  realized that if their
coalition won, some members would gain more than others,  eventually forcing somiie  of themii  to
switch sides, resulting in a frequent  shifting  of political alliances.  These incentives  gave rise to a two-
party system, in which parties had no serious role in policymaking  and were indistiniguislhable  by
platform or program (Tancangco  1S88).  Belonging  to a party was essentially  a meanls  of declaring
allegiance  to the patronage system  of a particular  leader and benefiting  from the distributioii  of thie
spoils. Parties alternated in power every 4 to 8 years. The succession  of generations  anl the term
limitation  on the presidency  created  the potential  for shifting  fortunes among  elite groups.
*  Weak  constitutional  restrictions  on rent extraction.  The  coinstitution  restricted  the types of
rent extraction  allowabkt  by those in office, guaranteeing  that at least some of the rents would remain
for the elite who were out of power at the time. For example,  transfer of ownership  of private
enterprises  to governmei,t  officials was prohibited. 8 As a result, rent extraction  required changing
regulations  and taxes, which allowed  some of the surplus  be left for those in control of the
enterprises. However, the weakness  of the judiciary meant that detailed restrictions  on rent extraction
could not be enforced. Thus it made little sense to engage  in effort-intensive  consensus  building to
establish  strong constitutional  restrictions  that were not enforceable  and, furthermore,  could
undermine  the goverament's ability  to protect the interests  of the elite. The elite avoided tormal
restrictions  on rent extraction  since any explicit  redistribution  rule acceptable  to themii  had to be
discriminatory  toward the non-elite,  thereby,  jeopardizing  the system's legitimacy  amonig  the non-
elite. Instead, a complex  set of informal  constraints-incoroorated in institutions  such as kinship.
religion, and patron-client  networks- developed  that helped regulate  group relations  and limit
opportunistic  activities within and between  various groups  (Wurfel 1988. chap. 2).
* Free trade and economic  parity rights  for U.S. citizens. As part of the conditions  for
independence  and future ass,istance,  the U.S. government  imposed  a number of long-term  restrictions
on Philippine  government  policies that were intended  to maintain  its influence  in the country  (Wurfel
1988, 14). The Philippines  agreed to accept  a U.S. military  presence in the country  and to maintain  a
7The  size of the group in power could not be very large, since once a support group got beyond a
certain size, the marginal  political  gain from adding  new members  to the ruling coalition  diminished
while the marginal  cost rose. For a discussion  of this "minimum  winning  coalition"  principle, see
Riker (1967).
'The 1935  constitution  prohibits  the heads of government  departments  and their assistants  from
intervening,  directly  or indirectly, in the control or management  of private enterprises in any way
related to or regulated  by the government.  The 1973  and 1986  constitutions  have similar paragraphs.7
fixed exchange rate and free trade with the United  States  (free trade was to be phased out gradually
after 1954). The Philippine  Congress  also amended  the 1935  constitution  to grant U.S. businesses  28-
year parity with Filipinos  in exploiting  natural resources  and operating  public utilities.' To preserve
U.S. interests in the country, the United  States  ofrered  substantial  foreign  aid, credit, trade, and
investment  opportunities  for the elite. This level of U.S. involvement  helped make Philippine
international  commitments  credible, providing  U.S. investors in the Philippines  with a sense of
relative safety."' As a result, the flow of foreign investment  and loans to the country was greatly
facilitated.
The dynamics of the system
These basic institutional  features  changed  somewhat  over time, and with them the commitment
capabilities  of the Philippine  government.  For the telecommunications  sector these changes  induced a
pattern of stagnation  and growth (discussed  laier in this chapter).
As the economic  parity and free trade aoreements  with the United States  expired, the
Philippires expanded  its economic  ties to Europe  and Japan, diminishing  the prominence  of relations
with the United Sta.es. These trends meant fewer gua.antees for U.S  direct investors  in the
Philippines.  Indeed, as time passed, U.S. businesses  found it increasingly  difficult  to defend their
interests  through the legal system."  However, this did not jeopardize foreign lending  because loans
could be more effectively  backed  by threat of various sanctions.  As a consequence,  many U.S.
businesses  divested  their assets in the Philippines  and concentrated  on lending, trade, and some joint
ventures.
During the 1950s  the Philippines  introduced  import and foreign exchange  restrictions  in
response  to the downward  trend in the relative  price of primary products in internatic,:oal  markets,
large government  deficits  driven by the reelection  concerns  of incumbent  presidents,  and increased
demand for foreign assets under a fixed exchange  rate regime that resulted in foreign  exchange
9The 1935 constitution  had restricted  these activities  to Filipino-controlled  enterprises.  In other
areas, only joint ventures  were permitted  with at least 60 percent Filipino  equity.
'the  leverages  also allowed  U.S. politicians  to mediate  among  the Filipino  elite and thus
contribute  to the long-term  stability  of the system.
"An important  example  of this difficulty  concerned  interpretations  of how U.S. investments  made
under the Parity Amendment  should be handled  after 1974. U.S. corporations  had assumed that they
could maintain  their ownership  over the land they had purchased  before 1974, but the Supreme  Court
disagreed, obligating  them to sell their lands by the end of 1974.8
shortages.' 2 These moves ushered in a period of import-substitution-based  industrialization  and the
emergence  of a large industrial  urban working  ciass and a burgeoning  middle class. These
developments  introduced  new elements  into the Philippine  politics  that reduced  the cohesiveness  of the
old elite and raised serious challenged  to their continued  rule (Wurfel 1988, 20-22, 112-13).  As
education  and employments  opportunities  improved,  the non-elite  populat:ons  gained greater
independence.  Patron-client  relationships  started to break down, and it became  increasingly  costly to
satisfy clients. Voters outside  the political machines  gained importance,  and the influence  of .he non-
elite on policymaking  increased. Given the structure  of the Philippine  government,  these dynamics
intensified  policy uncertainty.
As new players euitered  the political game, conflicts  arose within  the existirg institutions,
which had been designed  specifically  to prevent a shift in the balance  of power away from the elite.
Demands for a constitutional  overhaul  began to build. In 1970, largely under political pressure from
students, Congress voted  to form a constitutional  convention." 3 By then, even the elite had grown
dissatisfied  with the rules of the game (Fernando 1974)  and hoped that a new constitution  would
correct the problems  of "excessive  centralization  of power in the presidency  and the penetration  of
partisan politics into every type of government  decision" (Wurfel 1988, 108).
Meanwhile,  President  Marcos was looking  for ways to prolong his rule beyond the end of his
second term in office in 1973. The increasing  political  turmoil, especially  the formation of the
constitutional  convention,  provided  him with the opportunity  he was waiting for. He lobbied for
support at the convention  and, using the pretext of political agitation,  declared  martial law in
September 1972. With the strong support of the military  and of members  of the elite who felt
threatened  by the rise of the new political forces Marcos  was able to suppress  the opposition. His
positior was further strengthened  by the support of the U.S. government  and its allies, which saw in
the political trends of the early 1970s  a threat to their own long-term interests  (Wurfel 1988, 191,
330). Congress was prevented from convening,  elections  were suspended,  and opposition  political
leaders were coopted, imprisoned,  or exiled. Labor and peasant organizations  were suppressed,  and
strikes were outlawed.
To help legitimize  Marcos's continued  rule, he kept the constitutional  convention  open,
despite  the move by its members  to suspend  deliberations.  More than a dozen delegates  were arrested,
12 In fact, with the consent  of the U.S. government,  a set of expanding  import and foreign
exchange  controls was imposed  on the economy  beginning  in 1950  (Wurfel 1988, 14-15).
'3 The ccntreversial re-election  of President  Marcos in 1969  also seems to have played a role in
this decision.  (Abueva, 1972).9
and a similar numbei went underground  or fled the country. Marcos then prevailed  on the convention
to pass a  et  of transitional  provisions  for the new constitution  being  drafted, confirming  the
legitimacy  of all presidential  orders and decrees and giving the pzesident  extraordinary  powers. The
new constitution,  ratified in a plebiscite  Gf dubious legitimacy,  effectively  abolished  the old Congress
and tock away all forums from the opposition.
The judiciary was neutralized  as well. Though  the Supreme  Court proclaimed  that the new
constitution  had not been properly  ratified, it dismissed  the challenge  to the constitutionality  of martial
law, apparently  appreh-nsive  about its own survival. The two swing votes in the court feared that
Marcos would claim that he could replace  the membars  of the court following  ratif cation of the new
constitution  since one of the his transitional  powers was the right to remove  any justice by appointing
a successor,  4 The Supreme  Court ruling conferred  some legitimacy  on the martial law regime, and
Marcos moved boldly  and virtually  unchecked,  serving  as both legislature  and executive. He
prevented the %upreme  Court from ruling on the constitutionality  of any law by keeping a number of
court seats vacant. All lesser judges had been required  to submit signed resignations,  which were kept
on tile, allowing  Marcos to free himself  of the constraints  of the judiciary while maintaining  the
appearance  uf constitutionality  (Wurfel 1988, 133).
Martial law completely  changed  the institutional  structure of the Philippines. A small group
of the elite, Marcos's cronies, could enjoy  the spoils of absolute  power for an unspecified  period.'`
However, oppositicn  to their rule was growing from elite and non-elite  quarters  alike.  In search of a
stable outcome, in addition  to use of force, they attempted  to introduce  a new system of governance
in which the legislature  served as a new arena for political  brokerage, while Marcos maintained  the
powers of the president  and prime minister. Meanwhile,  in 1978  rumors of Marcos's illness spread
among  the elite and signalled  the possibility  of an abrupt end to the existing regime (Wurfel, 1988,
p.234).  This created a succession  crisis.  Wary of serious  changes in their fortunes, Marcos's cronies
began to act in such a short-sighted,  blatantly  venal  manners that Marcos's regime  collapsed long
before his death.
A successful oalition  of opposition  political parties and personalities  took control of the
government  in 1986. Given the relatively  small size of Marcos's crony group, the opposition  coalition
1" The two justices wrote "if a new government  gains authority and dominance  through force, it
can be effectively  challenged  only by a stronger force; no judicial dictum can prevail against it"
(quoted in Wurfel 1988, 117).
'"For detailed and well documented  accounts  of how the crony system worked and its extent of
activity, see among others, Manapat  (1991) and Hawes (1987).10
was quite diversified and span a very wide range  of interests, including  those of the now larger and
more influential  middle class.  As a result  the new government  was initially  rather unstable, and the
ruling coalition went through a number  of realignments.  The institutional  structure  that emerged from
this process resembles  that of the pre-martial  law system, but with fewer restrictions  on the
participation  of ncii-elite  groups and more safeguards  against the abuse of power by the executive." 6
While politics is now more competitive  and open, the old elite has managed  to maintain a
large part of its control of the system. The Presidential  Commission  on 3ood Government  (PCGG)
created in the early days of the new Aquino  administration  to dismantle  the Marcos crony system, hit
major obstacles after a few months as its findings  began to implicate  many  members  of the elite still
in positions of power (Manapat 1991; Clad 1987a,b).  Many of the investigations  were closed, and the
commission  failed to recover any significant  part of the assets transferred  abroad by Marcos and his
cronies.
Investment  and ownership  in a predatory  state
Under the institutional  structure of the Philippines  the group in power faced a high probability
of ending  up on the losing side some time in the future, so its members  had to devise mechanisms  for
protecting  their assets when they were out of office. One way was to shift away from sectors with
nonsalvageable  assets such as public utilities  and to place some assets outside  the country. Thus as the
probability  of turnover in the executive  branch increased, real investment  tended to fall. Another
protection  mechanism  was to finance  investment  with debt rather than equity, which helped shift the
risk and increased  the number  of people  concerned  about expropriation,  while involving  little loss of
control by the original owners. Foreign debt was particularly  desirable  for this purpose because
foreign lenders had strong leverage  over the elite, and default  by any borrower could hurt those
controlling  the government.
The relatively  strong degree of enforceability  of international  borrowing  contracts had other
far-reaching  effects as well. The elite group in power could borrow against  the future income of the
country and then invest the proceeds  abroad (Boyce  1992). Essentially,  once in power, members  of
the elite tried to cash in as much of the country's long-term  surplus as possible  and then to allocate
their portfolios inside  and outside  the country, according  to expected  returns. The more the group
could cash in, the more of its assets it tried to shift out of the country, fearing retaliation  from future
16 For example,  the composition  of Electoral  Tribunals  has been changed  to proportional
representation  of paAties  in Congress. Also, in the case of martial law, the president  is required to
convene and notify Congress  of the declaration.11
ruling groups who wc. d be left with less to extract. However,  to be able to borrow and keep assets
abroad, Philippine  enterprises  had to make some investments  at home. Thus real domestic investment
rose along with foreign  borrowing, but not dollar for dollar.
Direct fcreign investment  was not as secure as foreign  lending  because it was more vulnerable
to regulations  and taxation. As a result, as the economic  parity agreement  with the United States
neared its end, foreign investment  declined.  Foreign investors  sought  to share control of their
subsidiaries  with the Philippine  elite and limited  their involvement  to simple lending and contracting
whenever  the transfer of intangible  assets was not a major concern.
Though there were no prohibitions  against  state ownership, economic  assets remained
largely private. Public  ownership  of an enterprise  meant the total loss of the associated surplus once
the ruling group was out of power. Turning  an enterprise into the group members' private property,
in contrast, could help maintain  the group's control  over the assets and as least part of the returns.
Thus many foreign-owned  enterprises  were "Philippinized"  but not nationalized,  as similar enterprises
in other developing  countries  had been. Philippine  leaders  could put pressure  on foreign investors to
sell their assets to members  of the ruling coalition  rather than to the governmnent.  Also, on those
occasions  when the enterprises  of rival groups could be expropriated  or when failing domestic firms
fell into government  hands, the ruling coalition  arranged  for its members  to purchase  the enterprises
and secure  them as their private property.
Since the non-elite  had no access  to executive  power, their investments  could never be safe.
As a result, ownership  was highly  concentrated  in the hands of the elite, with most enterprises owned
by families  or cliques of friends. Corporate forms of ownership  with widespread  subscription  were
rare. When an elite group was in control of a corporation, its members  could siphon off profits to
their private accounts  and leave other shareholders  with little return. As a result the non-elite  rarely
invested  their savings in corporate stocks, and the elite who invested  committed  very little money  to
corporations  they did not control. Consequently,  the Philippine  stock market remained  undeveloped.
Under the martial law regime, incentives  to inves. greatly diminished  for all but the Marcos
cronies, who were able to acquire the enterprises  of opposition  members  and to create investment
incentives  for themselves  (Hawes 1986; and Manapat 1991).  Thus lack of commitment  did not reduce
investment  in the early years of martial law. However, investment  did not rise significantly  either,
because the cronies understood  that their rule would  end someday  and that when it did, their losses
could  be substantial.  Foreign borrowing  and capital  flight became  more important,  especially  after
1978  (figure 4.2). Investment  finally came to a halt after 1983, when the Marcos regime entered a
crisis stage, and foreign  lending ceased following  the assassination  of the opposition  leader, former
Senator  Benigno  Aquino.12
Politics, regulation,  and implications  for telecommunuications
To maintain  control of political  and economic  rents, the Philippine  elite have helped shape a
political structure that has stunted  the development  of efficient  institutions  for market governance  and
resource  mobilization. This institutional  failure is clearly reflected  in the main characteristics  of the
Philippine  regulatory system. Though the initial  form of the country's regulatory institutions  was
borrowed from the United  States, some key aspects  were modified  to adapt those institutions  to the
Philippine's political structure.
Characteristics  of the regulatory  structure
* Lack of independence.  Regulatory  agencies  are quasi-judicial  bodies whose  decisions  can be
appealed  to the Supreme  Court. Agency  heads are appointed  by the president, subject  to approval  by
Congress, and have no fixed  tenure. The president  can dismiss regulators  unilaterally.
* Congressional  control  of the budget. Congress  maintains  influence  over regulatory agencies
by controlling  their budgets, including  salaries and other expenses.
* Inadequate  resources.  Regulatory  agencies  often lack the equipment,  experienced  staff, and
other resources needed  to perform their tasks. Their budgets are too restrictive  to allow them to
effectively  monitor or evaluate  conditions  in the sector for which they are responsible.
* Ambiguity of regulations.  The mandate  of regulatory  agencies is typically  so general that
there is wide scope for discretion. Congress  has not tried to achieve  sectoral goals by providing
detailed  instructions  about the content of regulatory  rules. For example, there is no fixed rule for
setting utility  prices, though Congress  could  have stipulated  specific  procedures  or even specific price
formulas.
* Bias toward  restricted  entry. Public utility regulators  control  entry by issuing or canceling
investment  permits, known as Certificates  of Public  Convenience  and Necessity, in response  to
applications  from franchised  companies,  but they have no control over franchises. Franchises  must be
obtained  from local governments  or from Congress  if the coverage is nationwide.  Thus regulators'
control of entry is circumscribed,  and the system is biased toward entry restriction.
These characteristics  make efficient  regulation  virtually impossible.  Lack of resources
prevents regulatory agencies  from collecting  the data and developing  the expertise  necessary  to design
and implement  appropriate  policies, while the discretionary  power of the president makes regulations
uncertain and limits their credibility.  The reasons  for such institutional  limitations  are relative easy to
identify. Specific rules, such as price formulas,  that can create investment  incentives  are difficult  to13
guarantee  in a system in which the executive  has so much discretionary  power. The president  can use
a variety of meais, often difficult  to predict, to circumvent  a specific rule If the judiciary were
strong enouglh  to establish and defend  a particular  interpretation  of the rule, the government  could be
torced to abide by it. However, when  judicial power is constrained,  the judiciary may yield to
executive  demands. That makes it a futile exercise  to try to muster the political  support necessary  to
get a specific rule established  in law or in the constitution.
A strong, independent  regulatory  agency  could bring stability  to the regulatory  policy, but it
would be a threat to the interests  of the elite. Professionals  running such an agency  c.ould  use their
control to redistribute  the assets of businesses  owned  by the elite. The interests  of those in power are
better protected  when regulatory  agencies  have no independence  and few resources. Even the elite
outside the coalition in power may favor weak regulatory  agencies,  which keep the president fron.
being too effective in taxing the assets of rivals. Congressional  veto power over entry also seems to
be a means of reining in the president's power to share the profits of opposition  businesses.  In this
sense, congressional  control of franchises  and the budgets  of regulatory  a  ;ncies is a means  of
maintaining  some harmony  in the balance  of power within  the elite.
The problem of regulatory institutions  in the Philippines  is similar to that of the  judiciary.
When these institutions  are strong, they may be used by the non-elite  to achieve  power and rent
sharing. When they are weak, corruption  and inefficiency  thrive, but the institutions  remain under the
control of the elite.
Implications for  the telecommunications sector
The historical  dominance  of a small and competitive  elite has become  an impediment  to
credible regulatory  policy in the Philippines.  The weakness  of commitment  mechanisms  is an
especially  severe impediment  to public utilities  because nonsalvageable  capital constitutes  such a large
share of their costs. Some policy credibility  may nevertheless  exist, even in the absence  of other
commitment  mechanisms,  if opportunistic  policy changts by the government  would bring private
investment  to a standstill that imposes  large costs on the government.  In a country where existing
investment  in a sector is grossly inadequate  and there is a large pool of new technology  that could be
imported, private operators can guarantee  a minimum  return on their investments  because  of their
ability to "punish"  the government  in case of adverse  regulations.  However, this implicit  contract
mechanism  works effectively  only in a stable environment.  When the benefits  of implicit
expropriation  fluctuate  as a result of changes  in the country's political or economic  conditions, in14
some situations  the government  may find it worthwhile  to engage in rent extraction  and to jeopardize
investment.  Thus strong commitment  is necessary  to reduce  the risk of such possibilities.
The analysis  of the Philippine  political  economy  developed  in the previous sections  has
numerous implications  for the conntry's telecommunications  sector:''
Implication 1.  Telecommunications  enterprises  are primarily domestically  owned.
Foreign-ownership  was  possible only under colonial rule or in the early  years of
independence,  under the Parity  Amendment.  When  foreign-owned  firms are
Philippinized,  they are sold to members  of the ruling coalition  rather than being
nationalized.
Implication  2. Telecommunications  enterprises  are primarily  privately owned, with
ownership  typically concentrated  in the hands  of the elite.
Implication  3. Telecommunications  enterprises  with more widespread  corporate
ownership  are controlled  by a minority  elite with  friendly ties to the administration.
The enterprises  generate large surpluses, but yield low rates of return to stockholders.
The difference  is captured  by the elite through overreporting  of costs and
underreporting  of revenues.
Implication  4. Public telecommunications  firms tend to be privatized before the end of
the administration  under which  they are established.
Implication  5. Private investment  in telecommunicationsfirms  is likely to be high
under colonial rule, in the early  years of independence  under the  parity amendment,
and in the early years of a friendly administration.  Investment  declines toward  the end
of friendly administrations  and remains  low under unfriendly  administrations.  Reduced
investment  is accompanied  by capital  flight.
"  The model of the Philippine  political economy  developed  above  has a myriad of implications.
The dozen or so listed below are derived  and worded with an eye on the empirical  observations  in the
following  section. Explicit  presentation  of these implications  in this section is essentially  a means of
organizing  the assessment  of the model against  the historical  experience  of PLDT.15
Implication  6. Telecommunications  firms tend to finance their investments  through
debt, especially  foreign debt, rather  than equity. They maintain  high debt-equity
ratios.
Implication  7. Real investment  by domestic  telecommunications  operators  rises with
theirforeign borrowing,  but less than dollarfor dollar, with capital  flight accounting
for the difference. Tneirforeign  borrowing  depends largely  on supply rather than
demnand  factors.
Implication  8. Price, tax, and regulatory  conflicts  between telecommunications
enterprises  and the government  develop mostly during  unfriendly  administrations  or
diuring  periods of increased  political competition,  when the non-elite  become
influential.
Implication  9. Price adjustments  under administrationsfriendly  to the
telecommunications  firms are favorable to the industry. Under  a friendly authoritarian
administration,  prices approach  monopoly  levels.' 8
Implication 10. Given  the bias of the regulatory  system  toward restricted  entry,
established  telecommunications  firms are likely to succeed  in fending off competition
whether  the administration  is friendly or not. In addition, under unfriendly
administrations  or intense  political competition,  excess demand will grow since the
governmnent  is unable  to bring in new firms. Entry may be blocked even in
undeveloped  regions of the country  because  established  firms may want to reserve the
markets  for later development  when  more  friendly administrations  take office.
Implication I1. Private investment  in international  circuits is not much influenced  by
domestic commitment  capabilities.
" 8Monopoly  pricing may not be optimal if the ruling  coalition is at all concerned  about support
from consumers, some of whom may be its own clients. For a theoretical  exposition  of this point see
Peltzman (1976).16
The international  netv  ork is far more difficult  to expropriate  through regulatory action than
the domestic network. Regulators  have no control over a company's agreements  with foreign
operators  on the settlement  price of international  calls. If regulators  try to lower international  long-
distance rates for calls originating  in the home country, the company  can claim that it needs to collect
more to pay high settlement  costs. It can also limit the number  of outgoing  calls, forcing  domestic
customers  to have their calls originate  outside  the country. Revenues  will then be collected  by the
foreign counterparts and will not depend  on the rates set domestically.  Thus, contracting  problems  do
not much affect teleconmmunications  firms in their international  circuit investments,  and these
investments  continue largely independent  of the domestic regulatory  situation.
Historical  perspective  on commitment  capabilities
The history of the telecommunications  sector in the Philippines  provides strong evidence  that
the commitment  capabilities  of government  have had a significant  impact on investment  in the sector.
The focus is on the experience  of Philippine  Long Distance  Telephone  and a number  of other closely
related enterprises.
Policy credibility  during colonial  administration
The experience  of PLDT under colonial rule supports  Implications  I and 5. During colonial
rule, the administration  depended  on U.S. institutions  and adhered  mainly to the strategic interests  of
the United States in the Philippines.  As a result, the danger  of opportunistic  policy changes  was
minimal, and government  credibility  was high. Thus, effective  performance  and rapid growth should
be expected  in this period.
The basis for teleconmmunications  regulation  in the colonial  period was a vague law
requiring regulators  to approve investments  that affected  "public  welfare" and to set tariffs so that
utility companies  received  a "fair" rate of return on investments.  A decision  by the Supreme  Court set
the fair rate at 12 percent on revalued assets. All public utilities, including  telecommunications,  were
regulated  by a single agency, the Public  Service  Commission.  All decisions  were made by the
commissioner,  a centralization  of authority  that placed the administration  in firm control of regulatory
decisions.
PLDT was franchised  in November  1928 as a U.S.-owned  company, allowed  to operate in a
number  of large cities and all intercity  roots. The franchise  was for 50 years and stipulated  a 1
percent tax on the company's  gross receipts in lieu of all other taxes. Thc company  soon took over17
many of the local telephone  companies  in Manila and other population  centers and supplemented  them
with long-distance  circuits. During the depression  of the 1930s,  the company's local service stagnated,
but it continued to invest in long-distance  services. Investment  in local service resumed  after 1934,
and until 1940  the number of telephones  grew at an average rate of 8.6 percent a year. The Japanese
invasion  during World War II destroyed  most of PLDT's network. Thus, expect during the depression
and the war, the company  invested  vigorously.
Foreign ownership and  U.S. hegemony, 1946-59
The performance  of PLDT in the first decade and a half after independence  provides further evidence
for Implications  1 and 5, and for 9 as well. The continuity  of pre-independence  institutions,  the strong
leverage  of the United  States, and the concessions  granted to U.S. citizens  provided  a predictable  and
safe investment  environment  for both Filipino  and U.S. businesses.  These factors contributed  to a
stable and robustly growing economy.  PLDT realized high profits and performed well under foreign
ownership  based on the commitment  powers of the U.S. government.  The U.S. arrny took control of
the company's network in 1945, and in 1947, after some preliminary  rehabilitation,  control of the
company  was transferred  to General Telephone  and Electronics  Corporation  (GTE), a U.S. company
that acquired some 28 percent of PLDT's common  stock. Most of the remaining  shares were held by
other U.S. corporations,  often as a means of portfolio  diversification  rather than control. The Filipino
elite also acquired a small share of the company.  Between 1947  and 1959, PLDT rapidly increased its
fixed assets and telephones in service (figures 4.3 and 4.4).'9
During this period the company  enjoyed  decent, though declining,  real rates of return on its
assets and equity (figure 4.5). Telephone  tariffs had been set at relatively  high levels after the war to
attract the investment  needed  to rebuild  the system. Rates were then kept nominally  constant
throughout  the 1950s  (figures 4.6-4.9), and real values  eroded very slowly because  inflation  was low.
" 9Real fixed assets are calculated  by deflating  the values of annual investment  by the consumer
price index, using the perpetual  inventory  model  and an 8 percent depreciation  rate. The base year is
1967. A reliable appraisal  was made of the capital  stock as of December  31, 1966. Figure 4.2
compares these accounting  values with replacement  cost appraisals  for the years for which such data
are available  and an economic  measure  of fixed assets. The economic  measure  is close to the
appraised values in 1980, 1983, and 1988, but overestimates  the appraised value in 1975  and
underestimates  it in 19'.2. These differences  are probably  due to shifts in relative  prices and
measurement  errors in the two variables. In any case, using the appraised  values only strengthens  the
booms and busts in Philippine  Long Distance's  real fixed investment  and emphasizes  the seriousness
of the cycles identified  here. The prewar system was completely  restored in 5 years and then growth
continued  consistently  until 1959. Between 1950  and 1959, the number  of telephones  in service grew
14.4 percent a year.18
PLDT was ensured of receiving reasonable  return on its investments  for several reasons. First, the
U.S. influence  meant that the company  could  count on the legal and political leverage  at its disposal
to prevent its profitability  from falling too far below the competitive  rate of return on capital. Second,
the probability  of a currency devaluation,  which could  have hurt PLDT, was low, given the fixed
exchange rate stipulated  by the independence  agreements  between  the Philippines  and the U.S.
Moreover, any planned devaluation  would have been known  well ahead of the time because of the
requirement  for prior U.S. approval. Third, PLDT's customers  were mainly the foreigners  and the
Filipino elite. They were concerned  about the availability  and quality of service, and were not
interested  in a confrontation  with PLDT that could  jeopardize  service expansion  at a time when there
was still a great deal of excess demand (figure  4.10). Essentially,  GTE's control of technology  and
rate of investment  allowed it to capture part, though not all, of the surplus  of PLDT's operations.
These same factors influenced  the government's forthcoming  attitude  in meeting  PLDT's
foreign exchange  needs during the country's balance of payments  difficulties  in the second half of
1950s. Many other businesses  were rationed.  A  The government  did impose  some restrictions  on
remittances  of dividends  to foreign shareholders,  but that was a uniform policy affecting  all
businesses,  and the fixed exchange  rate imposed  by the U.S. government  meant that any losses due to
the delay in remittance  would  be small. In addition, since the government  did not restrict debt
amortization,  the company  could easily circumvent  remittance  restrictions  by increasing its foreign
exchange debt in place of raising  equity (figure 4.11).
On the whole, U.S. influence  implied  ownership  security, institutional  continuity,  and
economic  stability, all factors that made the investment  environment  relatively safe. In addition,
GTE's control of technology  and investment  and the excess demand  for telephones  among  the elite
ensured the company  that confrontation  with the government  was unlikely. Telephone  service grew
fast.
Currency  devaluation  and conflict, 1960-63
By the late 1950s,  the U.S. role in the Philippines  had changed, as the Philippine  elite grew
more independent  and established  new relationships  around the world. The U.S. government  lost its
influence  as a source of commitment  for domestic  policies. Sensing  the growing  weakness  of the
commitment  mechanisms  and lacking close ties to those in control of the government,  PLDT sharply
'This  point is clearly reflected in PLDT's Annual  Reports during those years. PLDT was even
spared the exchange  rate tax instituted  in the 1950s  to effectively  devalue the peso.19
reduced its investment  in the domestic  telephone  network during 1960-1963  (Implication  5). A
balance  of payments  crisis exacerbated  the problem  and ultimately  created  an open conflict between
PLDT and the government  when no price increase  was granted despite a major devaluation  in 1962
(Implication  8).  The conflict  fully confirmed PLDT's perception  of an impaired  commitment
mechanism  in the new environment. Interestingly,  on the international  side of its operation, where
commitment  was not a serious concern, PLDT continued  to invest  without  hesitation  (Implication  11).
As a major balance  of payments  crisis developed  in 1960, the government  negotiated  with
U.S. and IMF authorities  on a stabilization  plan. The IMF recommended  a major devaluation  and
decontrol  of the foreign exchange  market, which the United States  approved. PLDT would be little
affected by the decontrol  because it had not faced much foreign exchange  rationing. The devaluation,
however, could be very costly for the company,  which depended  on imported  equipment  and foreign
capital and whose controlling  shareholders  evaluated  their profits in U.S. dollars.  Had the
government  committed itself to adjust telephone  tariffs in line with the devaluation,  the company
could have gone forward with a major expansion  project (x-1) it had prepared in 1960. But the
company  had little reason to believe  that prices would be adequately  adjusted. Holding  down public
utility prices was a practical means of controlling  inflation,  and the government  needed to keep
inflation  down to avoid further devaluations  that could vitiate its stabilization  efforts.
In 1961 PLDT decided to postpone  its expansion  plan, even though the peso had not yet been
devalued. Holding off on investment  gave the company  some leverage  against the government.  The
company  did not formally seek to obtain a rate increase  before the devaluation,  but when the new
administration  announced  a 95 percent devaluation  in January 1962, PLDT and other public utilities
immediately  filed for rate increases.  Utility owners  argued that they would have difficulty  financing
expansion  projects without  a rate increase  (Ronquillo  1965). The Public Service  Commission  was
slow to respond. PLDT announced  publicly  that it would  not invest  until a rate increase  was approved
(Ronquillo  1963). The confrontational  tone of the company's  Annual  Report, published  in March
1962, attested  to the poor relationship  between  the company  and the commission.
Unmet  demand mounted  as the telephone  network grew very slowly after 1960, and the
company  hoped that further delays in investment  would incite the elite to press the government  to
grant a rate increase. But the government,  concerned  with the failure of the stabilization  plan, found
the cost of satisfying  the demands  of public utility  companies  too high. The Public  Service
Commission  was instructed  to take no action on the rate-increase  applications  until further notice. The
government's stabilization  policies  worked, and inflation  remained  relatively  low, exports picked up,
and GDP grew at a reasonable  rate. However,  the decline  of import-substitution  industries  and the
mounting  deficiencies  in infrastructure  soon slowed  GDP growth. Finally, the weakening  of the20
economy, the pressures generated  by the shortages, and the confidence  in the stability  of prices
prepared the stage for approval  of public utility  tariff increases  in June 1964. PLDT received  a 40
percent rate increase for its local services effective  January 1, 1965. The company  immediately
launched  its expansion  plan.
Had the owners of the major public utilities  been close allies of the Macapagal  administration,
which took office and initiated  the devaluation  in January 1962, rate increases  might have been
granted earlier. In particular the owners  of two major companies  in the power and
telecommunications  sectors had little direct  _  verage. PLDT's owners were mostly Americans,  while
the main supplier in the power sector was Meralco, which had been taken over from U.S. interests  in
1961  by the powerful Lopez family, political opponents  of Macapagal.
An important  aspect of PLDT's investment  withholding  strategy during 1960-63  was its focus
on the domestic  side of operations.  On the international  side, PLDT was eager to continue investing
in joint ventures. The company's international  circuit investments  were generally  unaffected  by the
kinds of contracting  problems  it faced domestically,  and it continued  such projects largely independent
of the domestic regulatory situation. Indeed, a submarine  cable project from the Philippines  to Guam,
with links to Hawaii  and the U.S. mainland,  was implemented  during 1963-1964  at the height of
conflict  with the government. This project boosted the company's profitability  during the second half
of the 1960s  far more than the 40 percent rate increase  approved  for local services. The share of
long-distance  revenues-in which international  calls play an important  role-in  total revenue  jumped
up from less than 20 percent in 1964  to more than 45 percent in 1967 (figure  4.12).
Philippinization,  1964-70
PLDT's Philippinization  in the second half of the 1960s  provides clear evidence  for
Implications  1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. With the Parity Amendment  set to expire and the absence  of
commitment  remaining  a serious problem, GTE would sooner or later have to divest its PLDT assets.
Implications I and 2 suggest that under the Philippine  political  structure, allies of the president would
be able to outbid others for the divested  assets and that investment  would be high in the first few
years, with the company  relying heavily on foreign debt financing.  And since PLDT was a
corporation, with a large number  of passive investors,  the rate of return for the stockholders  would
decline  as those in control received  large payoffs.21
In the mid-1960s  GTE was negotiating  to sell its shares in PLDT (GTE 1976; U.S. SEC
1977).21  By 1966 GTE had found a group of interested Philippine investors headed by Jose
Cojuangco,  Jr., and negotiations  reached  an advanced  stage. But soon after the inauguration  of
President  Marcos, high-level  government  officials urged GTE for political  and security reasons not to
sell its in:-rest in PLDT to the Cojuangco  group-Cojuangco had been an ally of the Liberal  party
leadership, which lost the 1965  election  to Marcos. GTE was told to deal with another group of
Philippine  nationals  the owners of the Philippine  Telecommunications  Investment  Corporation  (PTIC)
(U.S. SEC 1977).
The new group, led by Ramon  Cojuangco  (Jose Coiuangco's cousin), Luis Tirso Rivilla
(Ramon's '-%rother-in-law),  Alfonso  Yuchengco  (a banker), and Antonio M. Meer (a lawyer), formed
PTIC as a .( '.ling company  to take over GTE's shares in PLDT. A deal was concluded  in 1967, and
a new board of directors took over in December  of that year. GTE received  a stake in the holding
company (22.5 percent, as reported by Manapat 1993)  that enabled it to appoint one director to the
board of PLDT. The terms of the contract  provided  that GTE's shares in the company  would be
bought for approximately  $7 million  in cash and $7 million  in promissory  notes (GTE 1976; U.S.
SEC 1977). According  to Meer (reported in Tiglao 1993c),  the loan was guaranteed  by the
Development  Bank of the Philippines.  The notes were to be written off through a 5 to 7 percent
commission  on PLDT's purchases  of GTE equipment  "caused"  by the PTIC group.
The GTE was promised  to pay cash commissions,  amounting  to $484,000  by 1976, to be
delivered  through the Stamford  Trading  Co.. a Bahamian  concern  whose linkages  the U.S. SEC could
not trace.  The conimissions  were paid "to provide [the buyers] with sufficient  funds to pay back [the
loans].  Neither the investment  company  [PTICI principals nor a Bahamian  company  apparently
controlled  by them and used as a conduit  for the GTE payments  were expected  to perform any
services for GTE, the SEC suit contends"  (Wall Street  Journal, 1977). Finally, GTE provided  PTIC
with an option  to purchase  40 percent of GTE Industries  Inc., a subsidiary  that manufactured
telephone  equipment  in the Philippines. PTIC exercised  the option in 1971 in exchange  for a
$486,459 "non-interest  bearing promissory  note payable at the rate of $1 [sic] per annum" (Wall
Street Journal, 1977).
2 "The details of the ownership  transfer described  here became  public in 1977 as a result of
investigations  carried out by the U.S. Securities  and Exchange  Commission  (U.S. SEC) and GTE
management.  A legal case was filed in U.S. District Court in Washington,  D.C., by the U.S. SEC on
January 12, 1977, against a group of Filipino  businessmen  controlling  PLDT. The case was settled
out of court, with the defendants  accepting  a court injunction  without  admission  of guilt.22
Further deals were made as PLDT continiued  to purchase its equipimienlt  t'rom GTE.
According to Rosenblatt (1977):
The SEC said that GT&E' made personal loans of $580,000 to Cojuangco,  $280,000 to
Rivilla, $100,00() to Yuchiengco,  and $40)0()0 to Meer in 1971 whenl  their investimient
corporationi neeeded  cashi  to repay bank loans.  'I'lle personal loans were made by GT&E  "on
the conditioni" that the telephone company "promptly sign a $20(  million equipment purchase
agreement with GT&E,"  according to the SEC suit  .... The GT&E assigned the promissory
notes to an independent escrow agent with the instructions to hanidle the notes "in accordance"
with the wishies  of the people who signed the notes,  the -EC said.  This means that the notes
can be canceled without ever being paid.
The deals were clearly beneficial to PTIC and damaging to PLDT.  According to Wall Street
Journal (1977),  "GTE executives have testified  . . .that one of the factors in setting the price for
equipment purchase by PLDT was the amount of commissions GTE paid or credited through the
Bahamas concern."  Indeed, when the U.S.  SEC filed suit in  1977 against the PTIC group,  it had no
difficulty getting the defendants to agree to the court injunction of $1 million transfer  from PTIC to
PLDT.
After the GTE-PTIC  deal, other U.S. and Filipino  shareholders  in PLDT remained  by and
large passive investors. The PTIC group came to dominate  the 11LDT  board, and business  was
directed to enterprises  held directly  or indirectly  by the PTIC group. Insurance,  construction,  and
many financing  contracts went to related companies.  This supply  system created  the possibility  for
directors and management  to transfer the company's profits to their own accounts  rather than sharing
them with other stockholders.  The Philippine  Securities  and Exchange  Commission  and the Public
Service Commission  never questioned  these practices.
Although  President  Marcos had no interest in PLDT under his new name, revelations  after his
departure  in 1986 show that he must have had a major stake in PTIC, represented by the Cojuancgco
family.  The PCGG attorneys investigating  the case found that in May 1978  Ramon  Cojuangco  and
Luis Rivilla  had transferred  46 percent of PTIC is shares with a current market value of P170 million
to Prime Holdings Co.  at the price of P6.5 million (Sison 1986).22  Prime Holdings had been formed
I  As of 1986, the rest of PTIC shares were held by the Cojuangco  family (43 percent),
Yuchengco  (7 percent), and Meer (4 percent). Further details of the PTIC-Prime  Holding transaction
are documented  by Manapat (1993, 13-14),  quoting the minutes of the Special  Meeting of the PTIC
board of directors on 20 December 1977  and the records of President  Marcos and his daughter, Imee,
found in the presidential  palace  after their departure in 1986. These details show that the shares
tranferred to Prime Holdings  were in three blocks. One block sold by Ramon  Cojuangco  was 20
percent of the total PTIC shares and was priced at P1.95 a share.  Two other blocks of 13 percent23
by two of Marcos's financial  advisors, one of whom  admitted in 1985  to have acted as a Marcos
front.  Based on interviews  with those involved  and the evidence  recovered, the PCGG attorneys
concluded  that the sale had not been forced, rather the shares had belonged  to Marcos all along.,
The reason they were transferred  to another front group in 1978 is not very clear.  It seems that the
transfer may have been prompted  by Marcos' disease,  as his family members  became  concerned  over
securing  his fronted assets after his death.  Evidently,  they had greater trust in the two financia.
advisors who did not come from elite families  and owed their positions  to the Marcoses.  (Manapat
1991, 353-366).
In 1969 PLDT's franchise  was extended  for 25 years beyond its 1978  expiration  date. The
extension  generated some debate in the Congress  and the government  among those who believed that
PLDT should be sAbject  to corporate income  tax and those who maintained  that the franchise tax was
sufficient. A fina! compromise  raised the company's franchise  taxes to 2 percent of its gross receipts
and exempted  it from other taxes.
Between 1964  and 1970  PLDT experienced  one of its fastest  periods of growth. The
transactions  between the GTE and Filipino investors  described  above shed light on why PLDT was
investing  so rapidly both before and after the transfer of ownership.  The company's immediate  rate of
return had risen substantially  as a result of the rise in telephone  tariffs, the expansion  in domestic and
international  long-distance  revenues, and the decline  in real wages in the mid-1960s  (see figure 4.5).
For the longer term, Philippinization  promised  stronger commitment  because  of direct government
ties. GTE had a strong interest in starting  the expansion  early because, besides immediate  profits, a
larger network and an ongoing expansion  project could  help GTE obtain larger and longer-term
equipment-supply  contracts, thus allowing  it to share in the surplus  generated  by the ownership
change. PTIC's incentive  to invest was, of course, quite clear: After 1967  PLDT could count on
supportive  government  policy at least as long as President  Marcos remained  in office. It invested  with
vigor particularly  because, following  the investment  stagnation  of early 1960s,  major shortages in
telephone  service had developed.  Moreover, as the economy  and the middle class expanded, demand
continued  to grow at rapid rates (see figure 4. 10). Most of the new telephones  were installed  in the
were transferred by Cojuangco  and Rivilla  at the prices of P110 and P113 per share, respectively.
The value of a PTIC share in early 1978, based on its corresponding  PLDT shares, was
approximately  P1500.
3 Interestingly,  there was no change  in PLDT's board of directors between 1977  and 1981,
suggesting  that the 1978  transaction  was not intended  to shift control of the Company. The high
ranking officials  of the Marcos government  interviewed  also indicated  that both before and after 1978
President  Marcos had been consistently  supportive  of PLDT and its president, Ramon  Cojuangco.24
Manila metropolitan  area, where demand  was growing  fastest and subscribers  were more likely to use
international  long-distance  services.
PLDT's profitability  was also quite high in the second half of the 1960s. Although
calculations  based on declared profitability  show real rates of return lower than those in the 1950s
(see figure 4.5), the value of the profits captured  by PTIC through its contracts  with GTE could alone
cover the difference. 24 However,  there were no further telephone  tariff increases  at the time,
probably  because  of increased  political  competitiveness,  particularly  middle-class  activism (Implication
8).
PLDT was not the only telecommunications  firm benefiting  from a close relationship  with the
administration  in the late 1960s.  In 1966  a groups of President  Marcos's ciose associates  led by
Defense Minister  Juan Ponce Enrile formed  the Philippine  Overseas  Telecommunications  Corporation
(POTC), which entered into a joint venture with the government  to create the Philippine
Communications  Satellite Inc. (Philcomsat).  Philcomsat  was franchised  as a carriers' carrier in 1969
to provide international  satellite  services  to the Philippines.  Unlike other telecommunications
enterprises, however, it was placed  beyond the jurisdiction  of the Public Service  Commission,
purportedly  because  of the government's  ownership  share.'  Philcomsat  has been a major supplier of
international  circuits for all Philippine  telecommunications  companies,  including  PLDT. At the same
time POTC's owners have had interests in all the major telecommunications  enterprises  in the country
(Isberto 1986).  The company  also received  handsome  deals from GTE, similar to those provided  to
PTIC. In fact, the bulk of POTC's equity was built in this way (Isberto 1986). Again, after the fall of
the Marcos regime, it was discovered  that NMiarcos's  front companies  had obtained POTC shares
amounting  to 40 percent of the total in 1982  (Isberto 1986).
Devaluation  and the end of Marcos's second term, 1970-72
PLDT's experience  in the early 1970s  demonstrates  the problem  of commitment  beyond a
president's term in office in the Philippines  and clearly supports  Implications  5 and 6. As the end of
Marcos's second term neared, investment  declined,  capital flight picked up, and the debt-equity  ratio
stayed high.
241n  the late 1960s,  a $1 million  increase in profits could raise the rate of return on equity by 2
percentage  points.
'However,  the company's unregulated  status continued  after the governnment  sold its shares at a
controversial  price to POTC in 1982 (Isberto !986).25
In 1970  PLDT's costs shot up, primarily  because  of a 65 percent devaluation.  The company
had borrowed heavily in foreign markets. and the higher value of the dollar made repayment  difficult
(see figure 4.11). In addition, the tighter labor markets  of the late 1960s  and greater labor militancy
had substantially  increased  real wages and PLDT's labor cost. However, in contrast  to events
following  the 1962  devaluation,  the Public Service  Commission  gave provisional  approval for rate
increases  for public utilities almost immediately  after the devaluation  in 1970. Meralco, the power
company  owned by the family  of the vice president, received  an automatic  3 percent adjustment  for
every P0.30 change in the peso-dollar  exchange  rate (which had jul.aped  from P3.90 per dollar to
P6.44). PLDT received  a 40 percent rate increase  on all its local telephone  services. Permanent
approval  of the rate adjustments  came more than a year later, delayed by challenges  from business
user groups. The opposition  could not get the approved  rate increases  rescinded, and only managed  to
postpone consideration  of additional  increases  in the following  two years. The liberal attitude toward
rate increases  was not accidental;  events would have transpired  differently  had the companies  not had
patrons in the administration.  Indeed, as events under martial law demonstrated,  Meralco received
very different treatment once its owners were expelled from the ruling  coalition.
Although  the increase in telephone  tariffs in 1970  enabled PLDT to remain profitable  for the
year, the impact  was short-lived.  The real rate of return on equity fell significantly,  becoming
negative  in 1971-72.  Investment  dropped sharply, and real capital stock stopped  growing (see figure
4.4). The decline in PLDT's profitability  during 1971-72  could have been due to undercompensation
in the face of high inflation  following  the 1970  devaluation,  while slow investment  could have been a
consequence  of the low profitability  and the high cost of foreign  exchange, which caused difficulties
for foreign financing. But the company's annual reports do not make such claims. 26 The relative
stability  of the peso after the 1970  devaluation  and the slow growth of nominal  wages also suggest
that the sudden  drop in profitability  could not all have been due to continued  significant  cost
increases.
An alternative  explanation  based on weak commitment  seems to better fit the facts. In the
early 1970s  the main contender for the presidency  after Marcos  was Senator  Benigno  Aquino, whose
relationships  with the Marcos group were adversarial.  The Lopez family, which could have presented
an alternative  candidate  rromising continuity  with the Marcos regime, broke with Marcos in the early
1970s. As a result the probability  of adverse regulatory  action after 1973  was quite high. In this
situation it makes sense for a business  to transfer its assets abroad  and turn from equity to debt. This
26However,  Meralco's 1971  Annual Report  presents financing  problems  as the main cause of its
investment  restriction  in those years.26
effect would simultaneously  explain  the decline in investment,  continued  borrowing, and low declared
rates of return. In this regard, it is important  to recall that in 1971  PTIC owners had signed a new
$20 million  dollar contract with GTE, on behalf of PLDT, receiving  an immediate  $1 million in U.S.
bank accounts  (U.S. SEC 1977). At the same time they borrowed  another half a million  dollars to
gain a stake in GTE Industries, Inc. Of course, GTE was only one of PLDT's suppliers. Dealings
with others have not been documented.
Martial law and international  scrutiny, 1973-78
Barring other overriding effects, the first few years of martial law should be times of high
real prices and increased  investment  for sectors controlled  by government  associates  (Implication  5
and 9). Other sectors would also be expected  to follow suit, giving in to the tremendous  pressures
unleashed  by the broad presidential  powers  under martial law. Indeed, many sectors of the economy
did display these patterns, and economywide  investment  mounted,  GDP grew rapidly, and real wages
declined  sharply in the mid-1970s.  PLDT also received  tariff increases  and regulatory support, but
made no net investment  (see figure 4.4). This seemingly  contradictory  outcome  can be explained  by
two factors: a decline in the demand for telephones,  and the U.S. SEC's suit against PLDT, which
implied  termination  of the company's  relationship  with GTE. The first factor made it unprofitable  for
the company  to expand  during 1973-76,  and the second closed off its channels  of borrowing and
equipment  supply during 1976-77.
Soon after the declaration  of martial law, the Public Service  Commission  was broken up into
specialized  regulatory  agencies. 27 The new regulatory  agency for the telecommunications  sector
(except radio) was the Board of Communications.  This organizational  reform was unaccompanied  by
change in the regulatory framework  and had little impact  on telecommunications  enterprises. In 1973,
shortly after its formation,  the board approved  a 35 percent increase  for PLDT's local tariffs,
supplemented  by an additional  5 percent increase  the following  year. The impact  on real prices for
telephone  services seems to have been small and short-lived  (see figures 4.6 and 4.7). However, the
increases  were accompanied  by a subscriber investment  plan instituted  by presidential  decree. Under
the plan each subscriber  was obliged  to purchase 180  shares of PLDT's preferred stock (at a par
value of P10 per share), to finance  part of the line installation  costs and, according  to the presidential
decree, to achieve  widespread  corporate ownership.  These stocks  yielded annual dividends  of P1 and
" This change  had been recommended  before martial law in response  to the increased volume and
comp'exity  of regulatory tasks in various sectors under the commission's  jursidiction.27
could be converted into common  stocks  one year after issue at a 10 percent discount.  Considering  the
lack of interest among  telephone  subscribers  in holding  PLDT's common stocks and the high rates of
inflation  in the 1970s  and 1980s,  these terms implied  negative  real rates of return on subscriber  funds.
More importantly,  the funds provided  PLDT with some nonvoting  equity that it could use as a basis
for securing larger foreign loans, without  giving  up any control. 28
Another important  change in regulations  under martial law was the indexation  of local
telephone  rates to the exchange  rate. For every P0.10 increase  in the peso cost of the U.S. dollar,
telephone  rates were automatically  adjusted  by I percent. Although  this rule did not help much during
the 1970s, when the exchange rate was maintained  at a constant  level, it provided PLDT with security
against  currency depreciation  and boosted its foreign  borrowing  capacity. (Note that the rule allows
the rates to increase  geometrically  when the exchange  rate depreciates  arithmetically.)
On the surface, it seems that during the mid-1970s  PLDT's profitability  was low and it had
little incentive  to invest (see figure 4.5). However,  the situation is far more puzzling  than it appears.
The company's third expansion  plan (X-3), which it was implementing  slowly between 1973  and
1978, was designed  in the early 1970s  as a very small project (less than half the size of the previous
expansion  plan in terms of installations).  Though the mid-1970s  were boom years for the Philippine
economy,  the company made no attempt  to expedite  or enlarge the expansion  plan. To the contrary.
The expansion  was largely completed  by 1976, yet not until two years later did PLDT start its next
project. During this time the government's  supportiveness  was clearly demonstrated  through rate
increases, the foreign exchange  indexation  of local rates, and the mandatory  subscriber investment
'The  ratio of these funds to PLDT's real economic  equity reached about 5 percent in the late
1970s  and surpassed  6 percent in 1983. After that, their share in total equity declined.28
plan." 9 Though real local service rates were allowed  to decline in the second half of 1970s, that
seems to have been part of a strategy  to hasten PLDT's takeover of smaller operators  (see below). 30
A clue to understanding  PLDT's stagnation  in the first few years of martial law is provided
by the trend in excess demand (see figure 4.10). Unmet  demand fell sharply during the early 1970s
and by 1974  it could have been eliminated  by a 10 percent increase in the number  of lines. This was
hardly a situation that would induce large expansion  plans. But in a booming  economy, what factors
lowered  the demand for telephones?  For one, the boom benefitted  only those few who controlled  the
economy  and enjoyed monopoly  profits. For nearly everyone  else, real income was falling. In fact,
between 1970 and 1980  the average real wages rate steadily  declined  by 8 percent a year. Thus fewer
and fewer households  could afford telephones.  PLDT's customers  were essentially  the elite and the
upper-middle-class,  and most of them already had telephones. 3'
However, these arguments  do not explain why investment  continued  to drag until 1978,
though demand had begun to pick up in 1976. The delay is significant,  because it seems to have been
the root cause of the telephone  shortages  and quality  deterioration  of the late 1970s  and early 1980s
(see figures 4.10, 4.13, 4.14). The difficulties  that arose in PTIC's dealings  with GTE seem to be at
blame for much of the delay.
29Comparing  these favors with the fate of Meralco is instructive.  President  Marcos was wary of
the ambitions  of the Lopez family and after martial law managed  to effectively  expropriate  a large
part of their assets. First, the family's newspapers,  whirh had been closed down immediately  after the
martial law announcement,  were not allowed  to reopen  until they were sold to the president's
relatives. Then, declaring as a popular measure, electricity  tariffs were reduced  to force the sale of
Meralco. When this tactic did not work, Eugenio  Lopez's son was taken into custody  and accused  of
trying to assassinate  the president. Finally, Eugenio  Lopez, who resided  in the United States  at the
time, agreed to sell Meralco to the Meralco Foundation  Inc., a non-scock  firm set up by Marcos's
brother-in-law. Later, Eugenio  Lopez Jr. escaped  from prison. (See Tiglao 1989  and Manapat 1991,
387-392.)
30  Government  officials  also tried to impose  a number  of obligations  on PLDT, but were
inconsequential. For example, in 1975 PLDT was required to establish  telephone  service throughout
rural Philippines. Also, along'  ;.. other large corporations,  PLDT was ordered to grow the rice
necessary  for feeding  its employees  and pay an extra month  salary to them as bonus. These
regulations  were hardly enforced  and PLDT only paid lip-service  to them.
3 "1n other words, in accordance  with Implication  9, telephone  charges  in 1974 must have
approached  monopoly  prices. However, since PLDT's real tariff rates in 1974  were lower than in
almost any previous year, the nominal rate adjustments  could not have caused  monopoly  pricing by
themselves.  In this sense, the demand shift following  the income  concentration  of the 1970s  is an
integral  part of the above explanation  for the evaporation  of excess demand. With the demar.d  shift,
the new charge brought the telephone  tariffs close to their monopoly  levels and made a highly
suboptimal  capital stock the most profitable  one.29
During the mid-1970s  the U.S. public  became  concerned  about honesty in business  and
politics.  In response, the U.S. Securities  and Exchange  Commission  began investigating  business
misconduct  and asked publicly  traded corporations  to carry out internal  audits  about inappropriate
trading practices. GTE's audit uncovered  its shady deals with PTIC, and in February 1976  GTE
halted its arrangements  with the Cojuangco  group, informing  them that commission  payments would
stop. It also refused to pay some $1.7 million  that the group had earned under the existing
arrangements  (GTE 1976, 22). GTE maintained  its stake in PTIC, however. In January 1977, the
U.S. SEC filed a complaint  against the PTIC group. PLDT would  find it difficult  to borrow and
invest while its contracts with GTE were being  terminated  and the U.S. SEC was preparing an
indictment  against it. Although  the case was quickly  settled out of court, the conflict  with GTE
continued until December 1977, when the GTE quietly "abandoned"  its PTIC shares. 32 This
resolution  of the matter finally freed PLDT to resume its investments.
The only visible improvements  in the PLDT network during these years were in the number
of domestic and international  long-distance  circuits (see figure 4.15). Many of the circuits were rented
from related telecommunications  companies-firms that were franchised  as carriers' carriers. An
important  supplier  for the domestic long-distance  network was Domestic  Satellite  Philippines, Inc.
(Domsat), a company  chaired by Ramon  Cojuangco  and directed  by a number of well-known  Marcos
cronies (De Luna 1986). The main suppliers  on the international  side were Philcomsat,  Philippine
Global  Conmmunications  (PhilCom),  and Eastern  Telecommunications  Philippines,  Inc. (Eastern
Telecom), all highly profitable  firms owned largely  by the same group of Marcos associates  and front
companies. They also had close interlocking  interests  with PLDT (De Luna 1986).
Philcomsat's background  has already been discussed.  The history of the other firms is quite
similar. PhilCom  began in the 1920s  as a subsidiary  of Radio  Corporation  of America (RCA),
providing  international  telegraph  and telephone  services. By 1974  it was 60 percent Filipino owned,
with Defense Minister Enrile's family corporation,  Jaka Investments,  and some PLDT directors as
major shareholders  (De Luna 1986).33  Eastern  Telecom was established  in 1974  by more or less the
same group that had formed Philcomsat,  with the British firm, Cable & Wireless, holding a 40
32According  to Manapat  (1993, 11-12),  the "abandoned"  GTE shares, which had an approximate
market value of $11 million, were transferred  to Ramon  Cojuangco,  who paid $13,500 to PTIC.
Other PTIC shareholders  signed letters indicating  that they were not interested  in purchasing  any of
the shares. The per share price of this transfer was exactly  the same as the first (20 percent) block of
shares purchased  by Prime Holdings  from Cojuangco  a few months later. (see note 2.2)
33RCA  recently sold all its shares to Filipino  investors.30
percent stake. The verified share of President  Marcos in these companies  was about 40 percent of the
Filipino-owned  capital (Isberto 1986).
This interrelated  structure  of enterprises  provided  an important  channel for directing PLDT's
profits. For example, Philcomsat's  profits over the 1966-1989  period were far larger than those of
PLDT (Isberto, 1986). The structure also permitted investment  in long-distance  services unaffected
by PLDT's troubles. The demand constraint  in the earlier years affected  only local telephone  service,
not long distance. The greater concentration  of income  during the period implied  a rise in demand for
long-distance  services, an opportunity  quickly  seized by the elite with interests  in the sector. With the
backing of the administration,  they launched  new projects, including  two new firms, Domsat and
Eastern Telecom. Thus PLDT's behavior  seems to be an anomaly, a consequence  of the decline in
local-service  demand and intensification  of international  scrutiny. In all likelihood,  then, growth and
investment  in the telecommunications  sector would have moved into the expansion  pattern expected  by
the political-economy  analysis had these two factors not intervened.
Entry into the telecommunications  sector increased  after martial law (Implication  10).
Previously, entry had been restricted  because  obtaining  a franchise  from the Congress  was politically
costly. Under martial law President  Marcos  could grant franchise  at will, and he used this power to
arrange for entry into the growing  long-distance  telecommunications  markets for firms to which he
had ties. To avoid conflict  among his associates,  particularly,  between  PLDT and the newly
established  firms, Marcos restricted  the new franchises  to message  or data communications.  They
were, of course, allowed  to lease their circuits to PLDT for voice transmission.
Endgame  effect with abundant  supplies of foreign credit, 1978-85
The events in the Philippines  between 1978 and 1985  clearly exposed the fundamental  flaw in
the country's underlying  institutional  structure. The weakness  of the government  to commit  itself as
an institution  transcending  individuals  meant that the members  of the ruling elite would be compelled
to cut back sharply on investments  inside the country  as soon as they sensed an imminent  change in
the political balance, even though they still had access to ample supplies  of foreign  credit and could
ensure profitability  in their businesses. The experience  of the telecommunications  sector in 1978-85
conforms to this pattern and provides support  for Implications  3-7, 9, and 11.  PLDT received
favorable  treatment from the government  that helped boost real telephone  tariffs and provide access to
enormous  foreign loans. Yet PLDT's net investment  in local service was modest, and its real rates of
return were negative.31
Indications  of a crack in Marcos's authoritarian  regime  started to appear in the late 1970s,
with rumors of his illness. In hopes of institutionalizing  the extraordinary  powers of the president
under the 1973  constitution  and resolving  the succession  crisis, Marcos launched  a "normalization"
process. Reforms were introduced  in several areas, but to little substantive  effect. Cronies lost interest
in investments  and used every arm of the government  to squeeze  as much as possible from the
economy. The econom) slowed, inflation  mounted, and foreign debt and capital flight soared (see
figures 4.2 and 4.16). Opposition  leaders saw an opportunity  to bring down the Marcos regime and
intensified  their activities. When Senator  Aquino  was assassinated  in 1983, foreign lenders, worried
that they might be unable to collect on loans to Marcos's cronies  should the regime collapse, quickly
cut off new loans. The country  entered into economic  as well as political crisis.
Meanwhile,  the authorities  in the teleconmmunications  sector were providing  favorable
treatment to PLDT and other firms with ties to Marcos. The National  Telecommunications
Commission  (NTC), the new regulatory  agency formed in 1979  by merging the Board of
Communications  and the Radio Control  Bureau, approved  two major discretionary  rate increases  in
1980 and 1984. These increases, along  with the automatic  adjustment  provision, turned around the
downward  trend in the local and domestic  long-distance  tariffs (see figures 4.6 and 4.8). Also, under
a policy of sectoral integration  and rationalization,  PLDT was encouraged  to take over several smaller
telephone  companies. These companies  had been denied access to PLDT's network and, with real
local tariffs falling, had become losing operations.  The most important  was Republic  Telephone
Company  (Retelco),  the second largest telephone  firm in the Philippines  with a local network
approximately  one-tenth  the size of that of PLDT and bordering  .ts area of operation on the outskirts
of Manila. When the initial negotiations  for the sale of Retelco  stalled in 1980, President  Marcos
appointed a special committee  to resolve  the matter. Soon aftet the takeover agreement  in early 1981,
local rates were increased  by 35 percent.
To enable PLDT to borrow more in international  markets  than its existing  equity permitted,
state-owned  banks were directed  to purchase  nonconvertible,  nonvoting  preferred shares in PLDT
(Gonzaga  1982). In the early 1980s  such purchases  supplied  about t0 to 16 percent of PLDT's real
equity without  affecting  PTIC's control of the company.
Given the ample availability  of credit, rLDT's volume  of investment  and its debt-equity  ratio
rose substantially  as it embarked  on a new expansion  project (X-4)  in 1978  (see figures 4.3 and 4.17).
However, the increase in investment  spending  did not translate  into a commensurate  expansion  of the
local telephone  network:  during the rapid expansion  phase of 1978-83  real capital stock measured  at
cost grew at an average annual rate of 19.3 percent, the number  of main lines in service by only 6.732
percent (see figures 4.3 and 4.18).3 In contrast, during the earlier expansion  phase of 1965-70,
growth rates of capital stock at 26 percent and main lines at 23 percent were more in line with each
other.
The investments  of 1978-85  seem to have gone mainly into expanding  domestic and
international  long-distance  networks  (see figure 4.15) and improving  the quality of service, especially
for long-distance-related  services  such as direct dialing and digitalization.  Indeed, these investments
helped shift the composition  of revenues  toward long-distance  services  by leaps  and bounds (see
figure 4.12), even though real prices of local services  were rising while those of long-distance
services  were not (see figures  4.6 and 4.9). Thus the pattern of investment  seems to conform  to
Implications  5 and 11.
Considering  the increases  in real local service rates and the rapidly rising long-distance
revenues, PLDT's real rates of return should have improved  after 1978. Instead, they worsened (see
figure 4.5). The increase in PLDT's franchise  tax from 1 to 2 percent of gross revenues  that took
effect in 1978  does not seem  to account for the decline, as a comparison  of before- and after-tax  rates
of return shows (see figure 4.5). The substantial  increase in interest rates during the late 1970s  and
early 1980s  may have played a role.  But if so, why did PLDT accelerate  its rate of borrowing  during
1979-83  despite consistently  negative  rates of return? It could be that the owners  were anticipating
large returns in a more distant future, but that they would  maintain such a high level of investment  in
the face of continued  losses  on equity over several years strains credulity.
More plausibly, perhaps, profitability  really was high, but it surfaced  elsewhere. That would
explain the high rate of borrowing  and investment  in long-distance  servi.es while the company  was
losing money. Some implicit  evidence  supporting  this hypothesis  was given in the previous section, in
the discussion  of PTIC's connections  with carriers' carriers and with PLDT's equipment  and service
suppliers. Sison (1986) and De Luna (1986) offer further evidence  of business  dealings  with
companies  related to PLDT's directors and managers  and suggest  that these companies  were quite
profitable. An important  example  of such a company  was the Electronic  Telephone  Systems
Industries, Inc., established  in the Philippines  as a joint venture between  Siemens  of Germany (30
percent share), Independent  Realty (a Marcos front company,  42 percent share), and two other
companies related  to PLDT directors (De Luna, 1986). This venture served as PLDT's main conduit
of equipment  purchases from Siemens,  which after 1978 replaced  GET as PLDT's main equipment
34 If Retelco's assets  and lines are excluded  from calculation,  the growth rate of capital stock
declines to 18 percent and that of main lines to 5.1 percent.33
supplier. The extensive  powers of Marcos after martial law made it easier for his cronies to carry out
more of their transactions  inside  the Philippines  and avoid  damaging international  scrutiny.
The picture that emerges for the period 1978-83  is that of a telecommunications  company with
friendly ties to the administration  that is given the opportunity  to earn high profits, take over the
assets of other companies,  and borrow heavily. Because  it is a publicly traded company  controlled  by
minority shareholders,  its profits are channeled  to more exclusive  accounts. And because the company
is concerned about the stability  of the administration,  it hesitates  to expand  the local network, except
where the expansion  facilitates  long-distance  services.
As the disintegration  of the Marcos regime accelerated  in 1984-85  and the economy  collapsed,
PLDT's investment  came to a complete  halt, and attempts  to secure capital abroad intensified.  The
evidence  on capital flight in this period is extensive  (Sison 1986), and there is no disputing  that
PLDT's managers  deliberately  failed to remit foreign exchange  earnings  in 1985 (Friedland 1988).35
This effect is also reflected in the sudden  decline in international  long-distance  revenue  as a share of
total revenues  in 1985 (see figure 4.12).
Regime  shift, political turmoil, and regulatory  activism, 1986-89
The anti-Marcos  coalition  that took over in 1986 included  a broad range of interests  with
many differences  to settle. During the period of turmoil that ensued, political activism  among  the non-
elite increased. Regulatory  conflict  would be expected  to arise between  PLDT and the new
government  (Implication  8) and investment  to come to a halt in the local network  (Implication  5),
though not necessarily  in international  circuits (Implication  11). In fact, these are precisely the events
that transpired  in the early years of the new Aquino administration.
PLDT's first skirmish  came less than three weeks after the inauguration,  shortly after the
establishment  of the Presidential  Commission  on Good Government.  The commission  moved quickly
to sequester  PLDT's assets and to appoint  a supervisory  committee,  headed  by attorney Luis F. Sison,
to oversee its management.  A few days later, the committee's  task was specified  as the investigation
of the company's connections  with Marcos  and its past business  practices. Numerous  allegations  were
35  PLDT declared  some of the underreported  foreign  earnings later in 1986. Some of Sison's
(1986) other findings were disputed  by a subsequent  PCGG study by Mario Locsin  and Benjamin
Guingona. When preparing their report, Locsin  and Guingona  were the commission's representatives
on PLDT's board of directors. A senior Aquino  government  official  has suggested  that the latter study
was orchestrated  by the Cojuangco  family (Friedland 1988).34
leveled against  those in control of the company. In particular, Marcos's holdings in PTIC were
identified  and expropriated. 36 The sequestration  was lifted on May 2.
On June 18, with the commission  representing  the sequestered  Marcos shares, PLDT
shareholders  elected new members  to the board of directors. Oscar Africa, from a prominent  family
with significant  interests in other Philippine  telecommunications  firms, retired as president  and was
replaced  by Antonio Cojuangco,  Ramon's young son and a relative  of President  Aquino. PCGC
placed two of its members, Benjamin  Guingona  and Mario L,ocsin,  on the PLDT board, Over the
following  months, they reexamined  the company's business  practices  and issued a more positive
report about its management.  Eventually,  the commission  set the whole matter of PLDT "anomalies"
aside. 3 '
Meanwhile, in mid-April,  the Philippine  Bureau  of Internal Revenue  filed income  tax
deficiency  claims against all telecommunications  firms in the country for the period 1969-85.  The
firms maintained  that the franchise  tax had been intended  to replace all other taxes. In a case
involving  Radio Communications  of the Philippines,  Inc., the Supreme  Court disagreed, arguing  that
the tax code of June 1968  had implicitly  repealed  the income  tax exemption  of the franchisees  because
it made no exceptions  for this purpose (Business  Day, June 12, 1986).  PLDT, acting more cautiously,
dealt with the matter on a case-by-case  basis, eventually  convincing  the bureau to withdraw  most of
the tax deficiency  assessments  against  the company. However, it was unable to evade Executive  Order
27 of November  25, 1986, however, that assessed  a 35 percent corporate income tax on all franchise
holde-s and increased the franchise  tax from 2 to 3 percent of gross revenue. These new taxes seem
to have captured about 10 to 11 percent of PLDT's gross revenues  and reduced the real rate of return
on economic  assets by about 4 percent (see figures  4.5 and 4.19).
During the same period the National Telecommunications  Commission  ordered a 10 percent
cut in PLDT's local residential  tariffs "to make telephones  more affordable"  (Friedland 1988), but
36The  committee  was presented  with deeds of assignment  showing  that in 1981  Ramon  Cojuangco
and Oscar Africa had attempted  to buy the shares of Prime Holdings  in PTIC. However, the deeds
were not notarized,  did not specify  any payments,  and were not recorded in the books of Prime
Holdings  (Sison 1986).
37Jovito  Salonga, PCGG  chairman in 1986, responded  to criticism  about the commission's  failure
to pursue its investigations  of PLDT by claiming  that President  Aquino  had discouraged  him by
saying that "the Antonio  Cojuangco  family is not that bad, and is different from Danding's," her
other cousin, Eduardo  Cojuango,  whose assets were sequestered  in 1986  because of his close ties to
Marcos. Aquino  has confirmed  the statement,  but has denied discouraging  her officials from pursuing
any legal case (Tiglao 1993c).35
there was no change in other tariffs or in the automatic  foreign  exchange  adjustment  provision. 38
Later, the commission  became  active in regulating  PLDT's interconnecticn  with the small local
operators, setting a minimum  share of long-distance  revenues  for the small operators  to help them
expand and improve  their services. These changes  cost PLDT about 3 to 4 percent of its gross
revenues-much less than the cost of the new taxes.
In the first few years of the Aquino  administration,  the wide range of represented interests
impeded  the development  of clear policy objectives  and left individual  government  officials with
broad discretionary  authority. The new government  seemed  to prefer expropriating  PLDT's assets
through tax increases  rather than rate reductions.  The main common interest in these actions was to
increase government  resources. Explicit  expropriation  of PLDT was ruled out by the president, as the
failed sequestration  attempt in March 1986  made clear. PhilCom  and Philcomsat  also managed  to
avoid sequestration,  because  their patron, Defense  Minister Enrile, who had participated  in the
coalition  against Marcos, succeeded  in retaining  his post for a while (Isberto 1986). But Philcomsat
lost its unregulated  status and was ordered by NTC to cut its rates.  Other Marcos-related  firms, such
as Domsat and Eastern Telecom,  were less successful  in evading  penalties: their Filipino-owned
shares were sequestered  and new directors were appointed.
The presence  of new interests in the government  was also reflected  in the desire to reverse
the Marcos administration's  policy of sectoral "consolidation"  by allowing  new entry into the sector.
Ironically,  this reversal was largely based on the entry authorized  by Marcos. NTC began issuing
Certificates  of Public  Convenience  and Necessity  for firms with franchises  that could be interpreted  as
relevant. In particular, NTC authorized  a number  of small operators  to establish  new services, such
as cellular telephony  and paging, in competition  with PLDT. In 1989 the commission  approved
applications  by PhilCom  and Eastern Telecom  to establish  their own direct international  telephone
service (gateway).  The idea was to give these firms an incentive  to develop local networks in less
developed  regions and to spur PLDT to expand  as well. PLDT challenged  most of these
authorizations,  and though it was initially  unsuccessful,  it managed  to get some of the key decisions
of the regulators reversed  (see below).
Another policy initiative  based on similar couicerns  was the National  Telecommunications
Plan, developed  by the Department  of Transportation  and Communications.  Under the plan the
government  would use official  development  assistance  funds  to build telecommunications  facilities in
areas where they would not be in competition  with the private sector. Once established,  the projects
38 The Philippine  Consumers  Foundation  Inc. did attempt  to challenge  the automatic  foreign
exchange adjustment  provision, but the Supreme  Court dismissed  the case.36
would be transferred to the private sector in a competitive  process. PLDT would be eligible to
participate  in the privatization  process, but it would have to compete  with other firms. Around the
same time PLDT was denied access  to a concessional  loan offered  by West Germany's export credit
agency  on the grounds that the company  was too profitable  to receive access  to scarce development
funds  (Friedland 1988).
In addition  to changes  in the regulatory  environment,  PLDT faced difficult  foreign borrowing
conditions  because  of its own accumulated  debt and because of debt rescheduling  negotiations  between
the government and foreign creditors. Although  the company  benefitted  from a temporary debt service
moratorium  and rescheduling,  new credit was difficult  to obtain. The controlling  PTIC group decided
to let the domestic  network stagnate until the dust had settled, though investment  in international
circuits continued. A major fiber-optic  submarine  cable project was completed  in 1989. The group
also used its capital to expand its activities  in sectors and service  areas where policy commitment  was
less problematic. For example, PLDT's related company,  Piltel, broke into cellular telephony  service.
PLDT's financing  problems  and slow growth were viewed  by many in the government  as
stemming  from the PTIC group's fear of losing control-the group could increase its equity in the
company  only at a limited rate and did not want to share control with new investors  who would be
willing to contribute  more. This view, however, ignores the fact that in the past PLDT had managed
to borrow heavily, well above its real equity, whenever  it was confident  of government  support for a
few years (see figure 4.17). As the company's  history suggests,  the financing  problem is a
consequence  more of the weakness  of government  commitment  capacity  than of a shortage of funds or
equity that the PTIC group could commit  to PLDT. Members  of the PTIC group have substantial
assets outside the telecommunications  sector and continue  to make new investments  elsewhere. 39 If
they were assured of a comparable  rate of return in the local telephone  network, there would be no
reason not to invest at a more rapid pace.
"Normalization  " and entry restrictions,  1990-92
The events of 1990-92  show that under the country's settled, nonauthoritarian  regime, entry
into the telecommunications  sector is difficult (Implication  10). Also, increased  political competition
and influence  by the non-elite  can keep prices down (Implication  8). But, under the existing
institutional  structure this mainly gives rise to excess demand  since entry barriers remain strong
39For instance, in 1992 Antonio  Cojuangco  led the group of investors who took over the
Philippine  Airlines, which was being privatized.37
(Implication  10). Finally, the government  tries to privatize  the telephone  systems it has developed
before the end of the president's term in office (Implication  4).
By 1990 the new competitive  political  system had weathered  several crises and become more
settled. The leadership  also had become  more cohesive, as the elite regained  control and reestablished
the institutions  through which they exercised  control, although  the non-elite  groups, especially  the
middle class, had more influence  than in the past.
The PTIC group managed  to improve its political standing  with the elite groups that finally
won out in the leadership  struggle. The influence  of the Cojuangco  family in the legislature  and the
bureaucracy  and its control of a major newspaper  turned government  policies more favorable toward
PLDT and ensured that the PCGG representatives  on the boards of PTIC and PLDT remain inactive
(Tiglao, 1933a). However, the increased  competitiveness  of politics kept a lid on telephone  tariff rates
(see figures 4.6-4.9),  and the uncertainty  about the post-Aquino  administration  slowed  PLDT's
investment  in its local network. The number  of unfilled applications  for new lines soared, and many
undeveloped  areas remained  without  telephones  (see figure 4. 10).
Some in the government  had hoped that the competition  stimulated  by the authorizations  of
new gateways  and services  would bring about a fundamental  change to the sector and enable it to
meet the growing  demand. But the road to competition  proved a rough one, thanks largely to the
weaknesses  of the regulatory institutions  and the strong anti-entry  bias of the franchise system under
the more normal political conditions  of 1990-92.
PLDT's appeals to the Supreme  Court and evasion  of interconnection  orders threw effective
obstacles  in the way of greater competition. The court agreed with PLDT that Eastern Telecom's
franchise  allowed it to carry only "messages,"  not "voice." Supporting  the decision was the argument
that PLDT had "sufficient"  number  of international  circuits and there was no "necessity"  to have
another company  operate additional  circuits (Manila  Bulletin, August 29, 1992). This was in sharp
contrast with the court's earlier decision  that the mobile telephony  authorization  granted to Extelcom
was valid because  competition  would be in public's interest. (Gavino 1992, section IV.B.6.)
Curiously, PLDT did not challenge  PhilCom's  gateway  in the courts and even granted it
interconnection,  apparently  because  of common  interests  between  owners of the two companies.'
'Someone familiar with the case explained  in an interview  that the fundamental  difference
between Eastern and PhilCom  may be that Eastern  has been penetrated  by middle-class  professionals
while PhilCom is still an elite-controlled  firm and maintains  close ties with the PTIC group.
According  to the 1991  Annual Reports of PhilCom  and PLDT, at least two of PhilCom's  directors in
that year wcre related  to PLDT's chairman, Alfonso  Yuchengco: Alfonso  S. Yuchengco  III and
Helen Y. Dee, the president  of Malayan  Insurance  Company, a Yuchengco-owned  enterprise.  Helen
Dee has been a director at PLDT since 1986  and her company  has been providing  insurance  services38
Also,  Eastern had established a partner company, Digitel, to invest in a system of local networks in
areas not covered by PLDT,  whereas PhilCom had been less ambitious in that respect.  Digitel has
been unsuccessful, however,  in gaining a national franchise. Without it, establishing an efficient-size
network  in a contiguous area is nearly impossible. Even Extelcom th.t  had woIn  its court case against
PLDT had a hard time getting interconnection until its major shareholder,  Ruby Tiong-Tan,  sold her
shares to an undisclosed buyer. 4"
When the government moved to privatize two projects developed under the National
Telecommunications Plan, initially those who favored a strong competition policy prevailed,  and
companies without franchises were peimitted  to bid for the projects on the assumption that such
companies could operate the systems on a lease basis for 5 years while their franchise requests  were
pending. Thus Digitel, which still had no franchise, was allowed to participate, and it submitted the
highest bid.  Soon after the results of the bidding were announced, the Secretary of Justice issued the
opinion that it would be illegal for Digitel to run the projects without a franchise. The Department of
Transportation  and Communication decided to cancel the results of the bid and called for a new one.
Digitel filed suit and managed to get the rebidding postponed, but its managers realized that pursuing
the case would involve a protracted court battle.
By the time the post-Marcos regime settled in, Aquino administration was approaching the
end of its term.  Although PLDT had gained strong support within all branches of the government, it
invested slowly.  P.ofitability could not have been the problem.  The company's profitability was on
the rise and there was a number of firms struggling hard to enter the market.  PLDT even fought to
reserve underdeveloped regions and services for which it had no plans to invest any time soon.
Clearly,  all parties involved perceived highly profitable investment opportunities in the sector.  Those
in control of PLDT succeeded in restricting entry, but did not risk their own investment resources.
They must have been seriously concerned about the government's  inability to guarantee them a
competitive rate of return beyond the end of the Aquino administration.
Events took a new turn under the administration of Fidel Ramos, who took office in June
1932. Ramos decided to support the entry of new firms into the telecommunications market and to
dismantle PLDT's  monopoly (Tiglao 1993a). In February  1993 he presided at the signing ceremony
for a joint-venture  between Globe Telecom of the Philippines and Singapore Teiecom International,
which hoped to take over a big part of the market from PLDT (Tiglao  1993b). At the same time, the
to PLDT.
4'Manapat (1993, 40) quotes news?aper reports indicating that the buyer may have beet, a friend
of the Cojuangco family.39
president's  office also reversed the decision by the previous administration on rebidding the disputed
privatization projects and allowed Digitel to operate them (Tiglao 1993c). Thle adninlistration also
asked the Supreme Court to reconsider its ruling against Eastern Telecom, a request made shortly
after the author of the decision, Justice  Hugo Gutierrez,  resigned following allegations that the ruling
had been written by a PLDT lawyer (Panaligan  1993).4 More recently, President Ramos replaced
the representatives of the PCGG on the boards of directors of PTIC and PLDT,  who had been
accused of failing to vigorously represent the government's  interests (Tiglao 1993c). 43 PLDT  now
seems to bc financially hard pressed, and financial analysts predict that its profitability may decline
sharply in the next few years.
Lessons  and approaches  to reform
The political structure in the Philippines has been shaped by the desire of a small elite to
maintain political and economic power by concentrating power in the executive,  leaving the legislature
and the judiciary  relatively weak. Since the president can modify or reinterpret  laws secure in the
knowledge that the judiciary is unlikely to rule to the contrary, specific regulations to limit rent
extraction  are not very effective. Getting such constraints in place is a difficult task, with little
political payoff.  The formal restrictions that do exist are effective mostly when they take the form of
Congressional  veto power - e.g.,  the Congress's  role in the controlling entry into public utilities
tlhrough the franchise system.  Other constraints on executive power are largely informal, exercised
through personal relationships.
The regulatory system in the Philippines is weak and ineffective and lacks specific and
transparent rules due to the same forces that have weakened the judiciary.  With the elite maintaining
control of the professionals who are supposed to serve as "referees,"  the government as an institution
cannot commit itself to hold to certain policies and to rule out opportunistic regulations. This
environment induces a cyclical movement in the investment of telecommunications firms,
42The allegations are based on the opinion of David Miles Yerkes, a professor of English at
Columbia University and a specialist on the authorship of English-language texts.  He was hired by
Eastern Telecom to examine the text of the decision and compare it to the writing styles of Justice
Gutierrez and the PLDT counsel. Justice Gutierrez, other Supreme Court members, and the PLDT
counsel have denied the allegations (Tiglao 1993a).
43  Further allegations of impropreriety have arisen from the fact that Mario Locsin, one of the two
PCGG representatives on PLDT's  board,  "was appointed executive vice-president of Philippine
Airlines in March  [1992], when it was taken over by a consortium led by [Antonio] Cojuangco"
(Tiglao,  1993c).40
characterized  by short periods of expansion  and long spells of stagnation.  Firms grow mainily  during
the early years of administrations  with which they have close ties. At other times, they grow slowly
or stagnate  out of concern  over the possibility  of opportunistic  regulations.
The most fundamental  way to bring about improvements  in the Philippine  regulatory system is
to shift the balance  of power toward the legislature  and the judiciary, institutions  with inherently
greater stability  and continuity  than the executive  branch. The need for such a broad institutional
change  has long been recognized  in the Philippines  and, indeed, in the late 1960s  and early 1970s  a
constitutional  reformn  of this type became  the main agenda for the political movements  in the country.
Unfortunately,  that attempt backfired  and the Philippines  was put under an unchecked  authoritarian
rule for a decade and a half.  The system put in place after the years of martial law is more open to
non-elite  than its pre-martial law predecessor  and may eventually  evolve toward a more balanced
structure. However, short of a fundamental  institutional  change, what are the prospects for the
telecommunications  sector?
A number  of important  reform opportunities  emerged under the new political coalition  that
came to dominate  the government  after the fall of Marcos. Many coalition  partners  had strained
relationships  with the telecommunications  firms, most of which had tallen under Marcos's circle of
influence.  The members  of the new government  were interested,  at least initially, in increasing  the
flow of resources through the government.  They also favored increased  entry into the sector by new
private firms. These interests  manifested  themselves  in two developments  after 1986: the government
began to invest in underdeveloped  areas using official  development  assistance  funds, and entry by new
firms was facilitated  by a liberal interpretation  of franchises.  The cost-effectiveness  of most of the
public investments  has been quite low, and the projects  have been earmarked  for privatization.
Though PLDT has had enough clout in Congress  to stem any incipient  tidal wave of new
franchises,  many firms already held specialized  franchises  that allowed  them to operate in narrow
fields  without  effectively  competing  with PLDT. This system of franchises  proliferated  under Marcos,
who allowed his associates  to divide the surplus of the sector among  themselves.  After 1986, when
some of the Marcos-related  firms were placed in new hands, the National Telecommunications
Commission,  liberally interpreting  the scope of the existing  franchises,  allowed  these firms to expand
into areas controlled  by PLDT.
The regulators  hoped that investment  by the expanding  firms and the response  to this
competition  by PLDT would invigorate  the sector. They also expected  that privatization  of
government  assets would provide  opportunities  for the expanding  firms to gain a foothold  in their new
fields. It is not clear whether  these policies are working. Until recently, PLDT managed to hold back
some of the expanding  telecommunications  firms by challenging  the new interpretations  of their41
franchises in the courts. In other cases, conflicts  with new entrants  were resolved  largely through
interlocking  interests among firms (for example,  PhilCom,  the new entrant into the international
telephone  service, shares common  directors and stockholders  with PLDT).
Despite  disappointing  results so far, current policies show a new potential  for reform in which
the World Bank and other international  institutions  may be able to play important  roles. Among these
potentials  for reform:
* More specific rules. In the absence  of a strong  judiciary, getting specific regulatory
procedures  in place to control rent extraction  may not be worth the effort, especially  in the case of
complex rules requiring  expert judgment, whose impartiality  is often questioned.  A few simple and
transparent  rules, however, such as indexation  to inflation  with a lii iited range of adjustment  toward
the end of each presidential  term, may prove effective. Although  such rules are typically rigid and
create inefficiencies  of their own, they are likely to lead to better outcomes  than the current
discretionary  system.
Other specific rules can also be applied  to improve  allocative  efficiency,  though they do not
restrict rent extraction. Making the cross-subsidization  from international  long distance to local
services  more explicit can improve incentives  for investment  in the local network. Under the current
system, cross-subsidies  are implicit:  local subscription  rates are kept low and PLDT is allowed  to earn
its profits from long-distance  services. This system induces  heavier investment  in long-distance
services and relative neglect of local services.  One way to ameliorate  the problem is to explicitly
subsidize  local telephonle  tariffs, say by designating  proceeds  from a specific  tax on international  calls
to go into a fund that can be drawn on only if the company  invests in local services. This mechanism
can improve allocative  efficiency  and channel  more investment  to the badly underdeveloped  local
network.
* Greater  independence  of regulatory  agencies. A bill has been introduced  that would grant
greater independence  to the NTC through self-financing  and fixed  tenure for the commissioner.  These
changes  could reduce the risk of implicit  expropriation  by relieving  political pressures  on the
regulators. A financially  and politically  independent  regulatory  body could more successfully
withstand  changes  in the political climate. Such reforms could  also help provide greater resources and
incentives  for developing  the regulatory  capability  required  for efficient  operation in a technologically
dynamic field such as telecommunications.  Independence  may raise the possibility  of easier capture of
regulators  by the regulated  firms, but a more severe problem  of capture already exists under the
current system, when the firm has ties with the executive.  Capture cannot be a serious problem when
the regulated  firm lacks close ties with the executive  because  in that case, the government  will put
pressure on the regulatory body to keep service  prices down and, indeed, it is more likely to be42
successful  if there is overpricing. Essentially,  separation  of the regulatory  commission  from the
executive  makes it difficwlt  for either of them to unilaterally  implement  grossly one-sided  policies,
strengthening  the system's check-and-balance  mechanisms.
A major benefit of regulatory  independence  is that it offers stronger incentives  to foster the
agency's expertise and capabilities.  After all, important  regulatory  policies in that case will be made
by the commission  itself rather being dictated  from above. A relatively successful  example  of such a
reform in a different context is the case of Commission  on Elections. Granting  of greater
independence  to that commission  in the 1950s  substantially  reduced  ballet-box  fraud and rendered
elections  more legitimate.
Another argument in favor of regulatory  independence  is that once the NTC begins to act
independently  of the government,  Congress  will find it necessary  to design more specific rules to
restrain the commissioners.  A combination  of regulatory independence  and specific rules can greatly
improve the quality and stability  of regulations  and make policies  more credible. Of course, given the
existing structure of the Philippines'  political economy,  passing the appropriate  bill through the
Congress  will not be an easy matter. However, if supported  by conditioning  of future multilateral
foreign loans on the implementation  of such charges, the existence  of new forces in the government
may present a chance for an effective  regulatory reform.
* Increased  competition.  Pressures have intensified  for the relaxation  of entry barriers,
although  progress has so far been mixed. An important  advantage  under the Philippine  institutional
setup of having  multiple firms is that at any given point in time at least some of the firms will find
the government  supportive  and will have an incentive  to invest. And to the extent that nonuniform
treatment  can be challenged  in court, favorable  treatment  for some is likely to mean at least
reasonable  treatment for all. This is particularly  the case since cancellation  of franchises  and
authorization  certificates  is not easy for the government  due to the same reasons  that their
establishment  is difficult. As a result, there can be greater hope of policy continuity  since each
administration  will have some incentive  to maintain  existing  regulations. The increased  diversity of
interests in the sector would thus enhance policy stability  and private sector confidence  in the system.
In the context of the Philippines'  political-economy,  a greater number  of firms does not
necessarily  mean increased  competition  since the possibility  of cartelization  is not ruled out. Indeed,
there are reasons to believe  tha; collusion  rather than competition  can be the cutcome  of freer entry:
firms that manage to enter the market are likely to be associated  with the coalition  in control of the
executive  branch. While political turnover  may modestly  increase the number  of firms in the sector
over time, unless powerful new political forces gain influence  in the government  it does not imply
removal of entry barriers that allow incumbent  firms to block  competition  from new firms. As a43
result, successful  entrant firms have an incentive  to cooperate  rather than compete.  This may explain
why the entry of new firms in cellular and international  long-distance  telephone  services has not
provoked the kind of vigorous  competition  expected  in these highly  profitable  areas. Thus, entry by
itself may not generate  the arms-length  competition  that is conducive  to efficiency  and growth.
Of course, the entry of more and more firms over time may by itself establish  a new norm,
and competition  may eventually  emerge, especially  if political  coalitions  continue  to shift, the threat
of rent extraction  by unfriendly  administrations  diminishes. But establishing  new norms in this way
may take a long time. A more effective reform would  be to regularize  and ease the process of
awarding  franchises, in order to reduce the ability  of incumbent  firms  to keep potential entrants out.
Easing entry for new firms will have greater impact  if combined  with more extensive  use of
transparent specific rules and increased  political and financial independence  for the regulatory agency.
Besides franchises  and permits, an important  obstacle to the growm of competition  is PLDT's
domination  of local networks  and control  of interconnections.  The weaknesses  of the regulatory
agency allow PLDT to evade interconnection  and stifle other firms with limited local networks.
Although  PLDT has recently  agreed to open the company's facilities  to competing  phone companies
through interconnection  (Tiglao 1993c), the problem may not go away easily since there is no
guarantee  that disputes over details will not arise in the future. However, the problem is likely to
diminish if other operators  gain control of large local networks.  Of course, the most effective  solution
is to establish and enforce reasonable  interconnection  rights.
* International  commitment  mechanisms.  International  political and financial  institutions,
which have been relatively  effective in enforcing  the country's foreign borrowing  contracts, might be
able to substitute  to some extent for missing  domestic institutions  in providing  assurances  to investors,
perhaps through conditions  attached  to loans. For a long time after the Philippines  gained
independence,  the United  States  government  played such a role for U.S. investments  in the
Philippines. Exactly  how foreign institutions  become involved  in a country's domestic policy concerns
in a productive  way is a complex and subtle issue. As the analysis  here has shown, the enforceability
of foreign lending contracts  has sometimes  been used for the purpose of capital flight by the ruling
elite, to the detriment of the country. Similarly,  an administration  with friendly ties to
telecommunications  firms may want to use the power of international  institutions  to guarantee
monopoly  profits for the firms during future  administrations.  To prevent such abuses, international
commitment  mechanisms  need to be combined  with carefully-crafted  regulatory rules verifiable by
outsiders (a simplified  version of Chilean-style  best-practices  long-run marginal  cost pricing, for
example).44
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Press.Determinants  of PLDT's  Performance
Growth  Rate  of PLDT's  Real
Assets No. of  No. of  Return
Period  Political  Conditions  Economic  Conditions  Regulatory  Conditions  at Cost  Tels.  Lines  on Eqty  Causes
1934-1940  Colonial  Slow Recovery  Favorable  to PLDT  8.6  U.S.  policy credibility;
administration  Recovery  from Great  Depr.
1946-1960  Independence  with  Steady  growth;  Favorable  to PLDT  22.2  14.2  12.0  Foreign  ownership (GTE)
guarantees  for U.S.  Very low inflation;  and U.S.  policy credibility;
interests  (fixed  Current  account  Stable  economic
exchange  rate;  deficit  conditions and
Parity  Amendment)  fixed exchange  rate
1960-1964  Erosion  of  Moderate  growth  Conflict over rate  6.1  7.4  5.1  Renegotiation  of treaties
guarantees  for  Moderate  inflation  increase  in response  with the U.S.:
U.S. interests  Devaluation  in 1962  to devaluation  U.S.  acceptance  of
currency  devaluation;
Decline  of U.S.  role in
domestic policy
1964 1970  Increased  pressure  Slow growth;  Favorable  to PLDT  25.6  13.0  21.7  9.4  Takeover  by a Filipino
for Philippinization  Low inflation;  elite  group clc .e to
(Nearing  the end of  Growing CA  deficit  President  Marcos;
Parity  Amendment)  Marcos's  secure position;
. j  Large  unmet demandDeterminants  of PLDT's  Performance
Growth Rate  of PLDT's  Real
Assets No. of  No. of  Return
Period  Political  Conditions  Economic  Conditions  Regulatory  Conditions  at Cost  Tels.  Lines  on Eqty  Causes
1970-1972  Nearing  the end of  Slow growth;  Favorable  to PLDT;  2.0  11.5  4.3  -2.9  End game effect
Marcos's  second  High inflation;  Immediate  rate raise
term  Devaluation  following devaluation
1972-1975  Martial  Law  Rapid  growth;  Favorable  to PLDT;  2.1  7.1  2.7  0.3  Demand  restriction  as a
High Inflation;  Large  rate increase;  result of income
Income concentr'n;  Indexation  of PLDT  concentration  and large
Large  CA deficit  tariffs to the exchange  price increases
rate; SIP plan
1975-1978  Martial  Law  Rapid  growth;  Favorable  to PLDT;  3.7  5.5  3.4  2.4  International  scrutiny;
Moderate  Inflation;  Takeover  of small  Termination  of supply,
Income  concentr'n;  operators  encouraged  credit and other




Determinants  of PLDT's  Performance
Growth  Rate  of PLDT's  Real
Assets No. of  No. of  Return
Period  Political  Conditions  Economic  Conditions  Regulatory  Conditions  at Cost  Tels.  Lines  on Eqty  Causes
1979-1983  Toward  normaliz'n;  Growth slowdown;  Favorable  to PLDT;  19.4  6.2  7.5  -2.3  Uncertain  political
Rumor of Marcos's  High inflation;  Takeover  of small  conditions;
terminal illness;  Easy  foreign credit;  operators  mandated  Expanded  capital flight
Succession  crisis  High international  opportunities
interest  rates
1984-1986  Political  crisis  100%  decline in GDP;  Favorable  to PLDT;  2.8  4.4  3.1  -6.6  End  game effect;
High inflation;  Large  rate increase;  Very uncertain  political
Tight foreign credit  conditions
1986-1990  Regime  Shift;  Recovery,  moderate  Not favorable  to PLDT;  0.3  5.4  5.4  1.3  Strength  of interests
Political  Turmoil  growth;  Rate  reduction;  unrelated  to PLDT  in the
Moderate  inflation  Tax hike;  administration
Moderate  inflation  New entry permitted
1990-1992  Normalization  Growth  slowdown;  Turning  favorable  to  9.6  5.6  6.0  4.1  Establishment  of ties
Rising  inflation;  PLDT; Approval  of  to the  administration;
Increasing  CA  gov't-guaranteed  loans  End game  effect;49
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Figure 6.  Restoration  Time
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Figure  7. External  Debt  Inflows  and
Capital  Flight
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Figure  8. Real GNP per Capita  Growth  GNPINF
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Figure  9.  The  Ratio  of Trade  &  Current  TRO&CA
Account  Surpluses  to GDP
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Figure  12.  Average  Real  Wage  Index
120
40 
5O 51  S2  S~  54 Si  Si  50  Si  Si O0  61 62  62 64  65 Si  67  6i  63  70 71  72i 73  74  75  76  77  76  76  60  Si  62  3  84  65 N67  s1 68  9  00
Year61
Figure  13.  Growth  Rate of Fixed  Assets
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Figure  20. Economic  Assets,  Equity,  and
Long-Term  Debt  in Constant  1967  Prices  T
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Figure  21. The  Share  of Long  Distance
Revenues  in Total  Operating  Revenues  ~E
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Figure  23.  Interest  Costs  as % of Total  INTEXPRAT
Expenses  and  the U.S.  Money  Market  Rate
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Figure  27. Total  External  Debt
as  Percentage  of  GDP  DB/D
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Figure  28. Liability-Equity  Ratios
(Based  on Real  Values  in 1967  Prices)
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Figure  29.  Real  Fixed  Assets  CAP/rE
per  Telephone  and  Mainline  in ServiceL
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Figure 30. Accounting, Economic,  and  FXDASSTS
Revalued Fixed Assets in 1967 Prices
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